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Abstract
My thesis consists of three chapters relating to topics in International Economics. My first two
chapters study the effects of migration flows on the economic outcomes of stayers for both
receiving and sending countries. In both these chapters I develop and calibrate two distinct
general equilibrium (GE) models to study the quantitative effect of migration on the real income
of workers. The third chapter empirically investigates the relationship between firm export
behaviour and their composition of foreign-born workers.
In my first chapter I develop a multi-country GE model where consumers choose where
to reside, facing a trade-off between potentially earning a higher wage abroad but incurring
a cost to migrating. The novel contribution in this paper is that estimating migration costs
within a GE model allows me to quantify interesting policy experiments. In one experiment I
consider the effects of an expansion of the European Economic Area (EEA), which allows free
movement of labour for its member countries. I find that expanding the European Economic
Area to include Turkey leads to a very small negative impact on the average wages in the rest
of the member countries. I find the increase in migration from Turkey into the EEA is offset by
a decrease in migration to EEA countries from other member countries.
The empirical trade-literature has shown that members of migrant networks can reduce the
information frictions that exist in bilateral trade costs and help firms increase exports to their
country of origin. In my second chapter I utilize insights from this literature and add a new
channel, a trade-creation effect, by which migrants affect economic outcomes across countries
in a GE multi-country model with trade. In this setting the decision of workers on where to
reside and the decisions of firms on which countries to export to are linked because where firms
choose to sell their goods affects real income in a location which in turn affects a consumers
decision to migrate. My results show that the trade creation effects are strong. It is particularly
important in mitigating welfare losses for countries with large outflows in their population. For
example, the average real income of a stayer in a net-emigration country is 1.4% higher due to
the trade-creation effect.
i
In my final chapter, which is joint work with Professor Ananth Ramanarayanan, we study
the relationship between export behaviour and the foreign-born worker composition at Cana-
dian manufacturing firms using unique Canadian administrative employer-employee tax data.
We argue that if immigrants are lowering the informational, or language barriers to export to
their home country, then we should see these effects at firms that employ these immigrants, and
it should be evident at a country-specific level. Our results confirm this assertion; we find that
firms have much higher export sales to a country if they employ immigrant workers from that
country. The increase in export sales of these firms stems from the link between immigrant
employment and a reduction in trade costs.
Keywords: international trade, international migration, firm-level analysis
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1Chapter 1
Introduction
My thesis consists of three chapters relating to topics in International Economics. My first two
chapters study the effects of migration flows on the economic outcomes of stayers for both
receiving and sending countries. In both these chapters I develop and calibrate two distinct
general equilibrium (GE) models to study the quantitative effect of migration on the real income
of workers. The third chapter empirically investigates the relationship between firm export
behaviour and their composition of foreign-born workers.
Given that migration is widespread and affects the labour force of many countries, there
has been a long history of researchers trying to evaluate the effects of international migration
on native-born stayers. In my first chapter, I employ a multi-country GE model to analyze
the determinants of international migration for a set of 83 countries plus a rest of the world
(ROW) aggregator. In this model, consumers choose where to reside, facing a trade-off be-
tween potentially earning a higher wage abroad but incurring a cost to migrating. My model is
characterized by a nested CES production function that incorporates worker heterogeneity in
skill (high-skilled and low-skilled) and nativity (immigrants and natives). I calibrate the migra-
tion costs consumers face to match important features of international migration. These costs
are skill specific and vary by source-destination pair. Calibrating the migration costs within a
GE framework is the main contribution of this paper. This enables me to quantify a consumer’s
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migration response to different policy experiments, e.g. the expansion or contraction of the
European Economic Area (EEA), which allows free movement of labour for its member coun-
tries. I find that expanding the European Economic Area to include Turkey leads to negligible
impact on the average wages in the rest of the member European countries. I find that the
increase in migration from Turkey into the EEA is offset by a decrease in migration to EEA
countries from other member countries as well as an increase in migration to Turkey from EEA
member countries.
The empirical trade-literature has shown that members of migrant networks can reduce the
information frictions that exist in bilateral trade costs and help firms increase exports to their
country of origin. One can think of information frictions as the language barriers that exist
across countries that stifle trade. In my second chapter I utilize insights from this literature and
add a new channel, a trade-creation effect, by which migrants affect economic outcomes across
countries in a GE multi-country model with trade. In this setting the decision of workers on
where to reside and the decisions of firms on which countries to export to are linked because
where firms choose to sell their goods affects real income in a location which in turn affects
a consumer’s decision to migrate. Similarly, firm export decisions are affected by consumer
migration decisions because where consumers choose to settle lowers the costs for firms selling
to their country of origin. I calibrate my model for a set of 43 countries and assess the welfare
impact of migration by comparing welfare under the currently observed levels of migration to
a counterfactual scenario with no migration. My results show that the trade creation effects
are strong, and are particularly important in mitigating welfare losses for countries with large
outflows in their population. For example, the average welfare of native-born stayers in Portu-
gal improves from -3% to only -1.24% if we account for the role that migrants have on trade
costs. For Ireland, the average welfare of the native born stayer goes from -.22% to having a
1.5% improvement from migration when we account for the trade-creation effect. Firms which
would otherwise not find it profitable to export to Portugal and Ireland can now do so because
of the migrants reducing bilateral trade costs and this has a considerable impact on welfare in
3these countries.
I use the calibrated model to model the response of consumers and firms to a regional trade
cost reduction. Migration rates can decrease in regions with low trade barriers because there is
less of a need to migrate to a neighboring country when consumers can import more goods at
a lower price. The increase in imports decreases the price level in each country and increases
consumers’ real income. However, migration rates can also increase because the increases to
real income can now entice new consumers to migrate. Thus the size and direction of this
migration effect is a quantitative question. In the context of an experiment where trade costs
between the United States and Mexico decrease I find Mexican immigration to the United
States falls and real income in Mexico increases from the increased trade between the two
countries.
In my final chapter, which is joint work with Professor Ananth Ramanarayanan, we study
the relationship between firm export behaviour and the foreign-born worker composition at
Canadian manufacturing firms using unique Canadian administrative tax data. The adminis-
trative dataset we use, the Canadian Employer-Employee Dynamics Database (CEEDD), has
linked employer-employee data for all Canadian manufacturing firms between the years 2010
and 2014. These files contain detailed annual firm level statistics and comprehensive infor-
mation for every Canadian tax-file, including additional information on immigrant tax-filers
sourced from immigration landing records.
We use this data to support our claim that if immigrants lower the information and language
barriers to export to their home country, we should see these effects at firms that employ these
immigrants, and it should be evident at a country-specific level. Our results confirm these as-
sertions; we find that firms have higher export sales to the home countries of their immigrant
workforce. The increase in export sales stems from firms with higher immigrant employment
facing lower trade costs. However, if firms hire immigrants from countries where they ex-
pect high demand for their goods there exists an endogeneity problem in the interpretation of
our trade-creation results. One way to overcome this issue is to instrument for the country
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specific immigrant employment at a firm. This requires finding an exogenous source of firm
immigrant employment that is uncorrelated with current period firm demand shocks. We use
lagged immigrant employment and employment at other firms in the same industry as instru-
ments. Acknowledging the potential exogeneity issues with these instruments we also model
the firms’ employment decisions to hire immigrants. Using the first order conditions from that
problem we derive an equation relating elasticities of trade costs to export sales. The estima-
tion results from this problem are consistent with our previous results: immigrant employment
from country k assists with firms increasing their export sales to country k.
5Chapter 2
A Study of International Migration:
Looking Beyond OECD Countries
2.1 Introduction
From 2000-2010 the global migrant stock increased by an average of 4.6 million annually, more
than double the average amount seen throughout the 1990s. This increase is not only in mi-
gration to advanced economies, but also to developing countries. For example, the immigrant
population share in OECD member countries Canada and Australia exceeds 20%. Similarly,
Saudi Arabia, a developing country, has a migrant stock of over 7 million, an amount that
accounts for over 25% of their population. This rapid rise in international migration, which
now stands at over 230 million worldwide, has solidified the importance of quantifying the
economic consequences for source and destination countries from migration.
In this chapter I construct and calibrate a general equilibrium (GE) model of migration to
estimate the economic impact of international migration at the country level. The decision
of workers to migrate is driven primarily by differences in income and migration costs across
countries. Using this model I uncover the effects of migration on the real wages of stayers in
source and destination countries by estimating a counterfactual experiment that removes the
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possibility of migrating abroad; essentially sending migrants back to their country of birth.
A world of no migration impacts the wages and welfare of OECD countries negatively. On
average, workers in OECD countries see a drop of .55% in their wages. Similarly, an average
worker in a non-OECD country also sees a modest decrease in their wages in a world of no
migration. These results suggest that migration has had a positive economic outcome on the
stayers of receiving countries.
I use my model to quantify the economic impact of international migration for a set of 83
countries plus a rest of the world (ROW) aggregator. My model is characterized by a nested
CES production function that incorporates worker heterogeneity in skill (high-skilled and low-
skilled) and nativity (immigrants and natives). I use this framework to estimate parameters in
a migration cost function that varies by skill to match the compositional patterns of regional
and worldwide migration. In my model, a consumer observes wages, prices, and migration
costs for all possible destination countries. The cost of staying in their country of birth is
zero. Taking all this information the consumer chooses to reside in the country that maximizes
his utility; he faces a trade-off between earning a higher wage abroad and paying a migration
cost. However, the wages and prices offered in a country will be affected by the labour supply
choices of all other emigrants and immigrants in the world.
In addition to the no-migration counterfactual experiment I use the calibrated model to es-
timate the response of workers to changes in the expansion or reduction of countries that are
members of the European Economic Area explicitly. In one experiment I simulate the response
of workers in to Turkey joining the EEA. By studying this in a GE framework I can highlight
the indirect effects of these types of policy scenarios. In addition to the migration decisions
between European countries and Turkey being directly affected, there are also indirect effects
stemming from the changes in the decision of workers outside these areas to migrate within
EEA countries or to other countries. I find these indirect effects are considerable when evalu-
ating the overall impact from such an experiment.
I contribute to the limited literature on quantifying the impact from migration by expanding
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the set of countries to include many non-OECD countries for which the effects of migration
can be studied. The rise of highly skilled immigrants from developing countries settling in
OECD countries has increased the need to measure the impact from migration for developing,
non-OECD countries. Between 1990 and 2000 there was a 64% increase in highly skilled
immigration to OECD countries against only a 14% increase in low skilled immigration (Beine,
Docquier and Rapoport, 2008). I can measure the impact for a large set of countries because
my calibration methodology is designed to utilize accessible country level information, such
as immigrant and native-born populations. In addition to this standard country level data I also
require a richer set of migration data, specifically the stock of bilateral migration decomposed
by skill levels. There is now reliable data accessible from the OECD Database on Immigrants
in OECD and non-OECD Countries (DIOC-E) that contains this information.
Additionally since I model and individual’s migration decision, I am not restricted to only
quantitative experiments with exogenous shifts in migration populations, the most popular be-
ing a comparison of a world with and without migration. This modelling decision allows for
more interesting policy experiments, including an experiment where we are able to grant coun-
tries currently on the road to European Union(EU) membership, Albania, Montenegro, Serbia,
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia and Turkey, the right to work in the European Eco-
nomic Area1 (EEA) without a work permit. In my model this will correspond to a reduction in
the costs an individual faces when choosing to migrate within the EEA.
This paper relates to the literature on analyzing the determinants and composition of inter-
national migration. Sjaastad (1962) explored the returns to migration in a human capital model
and established the seminal economic framework to interpret migration patterns. The simple,
yet profound assertion of this model is that migration is a response to differences in the return
to labour supply. This model served as the groundwork for numerous models in the migration
literature that followed; the Borjas (1987) model of human capital investment and international
migration is the most popular of these subsequent works (O¨rn B. Bodvarsson and den Berg,
1The European Economic Area includes all countries in the EU plus Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein
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2013). My work relates to Borjas (1987) in that we both specify a model of migration that
decomposes an individual’s earnings into observed and unobserved portions. The separation of
earnings into two parts is important when evaluating the decision to migrate or not. Work done
by Grogger and Hanson (2011), Rosenzweig (2006) and Beine, Docquier and O¨zden (2011)
use a similar structure to analyze the determinants of international migration. They find that a
simple model of income maximization can account for both the positive sorting - immigrants
will settle in destination countries with high rewards to skill and positive selection - higher
skilled workers are more likely to emigrate. Another important strand of the immigration lit-
erature examines the wage and production impact from migration on destination and source
countries. I adapt a nested CES production function framework similar in structure to work
by Di Giovanni, Levchenko and Ortega (2015); Ottaviano and Peri (2012) who investigate the
impact of immigration on source and destination country wages and welfare. The consensus in
these papers is that immigration has had a small positive effect on the average wages of natives.
2.2 Model Framework
I adapt a framework most similar to Docquier, Machado and Sekkat (2015) and Grogger and
Hanson (2011) to analyze the movements of worldwide migration using a nested CES pro-
duction technology that incorporates worker heterogeneity in skill level: high and low skilled
labour, and nativity: immigrant and native-born.
The model consists of N countries, indexed n ∈ {1, . . . ,N}. The starting population of
workers of skill type s in country n is denoted by Nns. There is a single consumption good in
each country that is not internationally traded.
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2.2.1 Preferences
Worker i′s decision to migrate is determined by maximizing their utility over moving to country
n and consuming Qin at a country specific price Pn. All workers of skill type s born in country
j and working in country n inelastically supply 1 unit of labour and earn a wage w jns. A worker
is characterized by their skill type s ∈ {H, L} and their country of birth and country of work
pair. Worker i born in country j solves:
max
n
U(Qi jns) − c jns + εi jn
subject to
PnQi jns ≤ Ii jns
where Ii jns ∈ {w js, w j1s, ...,w jns}, c jns is the cost of migrating from country j to n for a worker
of skill type s, and εi jn is the idiosyncratic shock for worker i born in country j and migrating
to country n.
Substituting in the budget constraint I can write the consumer problem as,
max
n
U( Ii jnsPn ) − c jns + εi jn
max
n
{
U(w jsP j ) + εi j j,U(
w j1s
P1
) − c j1s + εi j1, . . . ,U(w jnsPn ) − c jns + εi jn
}
A worker can choose to reside and work in their country of birth (in this case country j)
and earn w js , allowing for the consumption
w js
P j
. A worker can also choose to reside in country
n, pay a migration cost c jns and earn wage w jns, allowing for the consumption of
w jns
Pn
.
Assuming a linear utility function, standard optimization steps yield the indirect utility from
migrating to country n,
Vi jns(Pn, Ii jns) =
w jns
Pn
− c jns + εi jn
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Finally, assuming εi jn follows a type 1 extreme value distribution I can apply the results of
McFadden (1974) to uncover the probability of a worker of skill s born in country j choosing
to migrate to country n.
δ jns = Pr
[
V jns = max
k
Vi jks
]
= Pr
[
Vi jns > Vi j−ns
]
=
exp
[w jns
Pn
− c jns
]
∑
k∈n
exp
[w jks
Pk
− c jks
] (2.1)
The intuition of equation (2.1) can be summarized as follows: each worker i born in country
j of skill type s receives a draw from a type 1 extreme value distribution that affects their utility
cost of migrating to country n. Given c jns, a higher εi jn makes migration to country n more
attractive, whereas a higher c jns makes migration less attractive.
Ln denotes the population in country n after migration.
Ln =
∑
s
∑
j
δ jnsN js
2.2.2 Production Technology
Each country produces a non-tradeable good. Countries’ production technologies differ in
productivity. Firms in each country n are competitive and produce using a combination of high
and low skill labour, LnH and LnL respectively. Firms in country n produce using a nested CES
production of the form,
Yn = An(θHL
ρ
nH + θLL
ρ
nL)
1
ρ
where ρ = 1 − 1
σs
, σs is the elasticity of substitution across skill types, s ∈ {H, L}, and the
parameters θH, θL represent technology parameters that shift the relative productivity of high
and low skill labour, with θH + θL = 1.
CES nests are ordered by skill levels: high skilled or low skilled, s ∈ {H, L}, and nativity:
native-born working in his country of birth or an immigrant worker, x ∈ {N, M}.
High skilled workers working in country n are composed of native-born workers for whom
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it is optimal to remain in country n (x = N) and immigrant workers for which is it optimal
to work in country n where their country of birth is j , n (x = M). βM and βN captures the
relative productivity of migrant and native high skilled labour, with βM + βN = 1.
LnH =
[∑
x
(
βxL
γ
xnH
)] 1γ
LnH =
[
βN L
γ
NnH + βML
γ
MnH
] 1
γ
LnH =
[
βN (δnnHNnH)γ + βM
(∑
j,n
δ jnHN jH
)γ] 1γ
(2.2)
where γ = 1 − 1
σx
and σx is the elasticity of substitution between (un)skilled natives and
(un)skilled migrants. The first component in the RHS of equation (2.2) corresponds to the high
skilled labour supplied by natives in country n. The second component in the RHS of equation
(2.2) corresponds to the high skilled labour supplied by all migrants in country n.
Similarly low skilled workers working in country n aggregates to the following
LnL =
[∑
x
(
αxL
γ
xnL
)] 1γ
LnL =
[
αN L
γ
NnL + αML
γ
MnL
] 1
γ
LnL =
[
αN (δnnLNnL)γ + αM
(∑
j,n
δ jnLN jL
)γ] 1γ
(2.3)
where αM and αN captures the relative productivity of migrant and native low skilled labour,
with αM + αN = 1.
The benefits of using a nested CES production function are that it allows for a simple
implementation of imperfect substitution among worker types. Wages of workers will depend
on the substitutability or complementarity among worker types, e.g. the downward pressure
on the wages of high skilled native-born workers stemming from increases in high-skilled
immigrant workers is more pronounced if the substitutability between the two groups is high.
Profit maximization implies that workers will be paid their marginal product. Therefore a
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worker of skill s and nativity x in country n earns the following wage,
∂Yn
∂Lxns
=
∂Yn
∂Lns
× ∂Lns
∂Lxns
The marginal product of low skilled workers of nativity x is equal to,
wxnl =
∂Yn
∂LxnL
=
∂Yn
∂LnL
× ∂LnL
∂LxnL
= An
1
ρ
[
θHL
ρ
nH + θLL
ρ
nL
] 1
ρ−1
ρθLL
ρ−1
nL ×
1
γ
∑
x
(αxL
γ
xnL)

1
γ−1
γαxL
γ−1
xnL
where
[∑
x
(
αxL
γ
xnL
)] 1γ−1
= L1−γnL and the wages of low skilled workers equals,
wxnL = An
[
θnHL
ρ
nH + θnLL
ρ
nL
] 1
ρ−1
θLL
ρ−γ
nL αxL
γ−1
xnL (2.4)
Similarly, the wages of high skilled workers of nativity x is equal to,
wxnH = An
[
θHL
ρ
nH + θLL
ρ
nL
] 1
ρ−1
θHL
ρ−γ
nH βxL
γ−1
xnH (2.5)
Empirical evidence shows migrant workers earn significantly less than their native-born
counterparts even with similar observable characteristics (Green and Riddell, 2003; Sweetman,
2004). The evidence suggests that a portion of the productivity of a worker is lost when they
migrate to a new country; there is an element of a migrant’s human capital produced abroad that
is specific to the source country, and that is not transferable to the source marketplace. Though
it is important, for simplicity and tractability I do not model this aspect of migration. Instead
it is assumed to be explicitly in the costs that migrants face when deciding which country to
migrate to.
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2.2.3 Equilibrium
Equilibrium is defined as a set of wages {w∗xns}, prices {P∗n}, and migration decisions {n∗i js} such
that
1. Every worker i maximizes their utility by choosing the optimal n∗i jns ∈ {1, . . .N}
2. Every firm j in country n chooses a production plan to maximize profits
max P∗nYn − w∗nHLnH − w∗nLLnL
subject to
Yn ≤ AnF(LnH, LnL), ∀n
with wages equaling the following as a result of optimization
w∗xnH = An
[
θHL
ρ
nH + θLL
ρ
nL
] 1
ρ−1
θHL
ρ−γ
nH βxL
γ−1
xnH
w∗xnL = An
[
θnHL
ρ
nH + θnLL
ρ
nL
] 1
ρ−1
θLL
ρ−γ
nL αxL
γ−1
xnL
3. Markets clear in all countries
Yn =
∑
i∈n
Qin
and labour demand and labour supply of each worker type is equal in all countries
LNns = δnnsNns
LMns =
∑
j,n
δ jnsN js
2.3 Data
I calibrate the model using 2010 data from four major sources: the OECD, the World Bank, and
datasets complied by Barro and Lee (2013) and Mayer and Zignago (2011). From the OECD
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Database on Immigrants in OECD and non-OECD Countries (DOIC-E) I have information
on bilateral stock of migrants at the country level decomposed by skill level. I use country
population statistics from the World Bank populations dataset. The Barro and Lee (2013)
dataset contains educational attainment statistics which I use to assign a high and low skilled
proportion of the population for every country. Finally, the Mayer and Zignago (2011) dataset
contains bilateral country information, such as the geodesic between countries2, suitable to
capture the costs of migration.
I construct the initial labour force for each country in my model for the year 2010.3 I
can ascertain the initial labour force in each country, consisting of the native-born working
population divided into high and low skill types by combining data from three different sources.
I begin with the OECD’s DOIC-E database where I have information on the bilateral stock of
migrants across countries. Merging this information with data on country populations from
the World Bank I determine the proportion of migrants in each country and subtract them to
back out the native portion. Finally, I compute the proportion of high and low skilled natives
in each country by using the educational attainment data found in Barro and Lee (2013). I
assign the high skilled proportion of the native labour force in each country as the percentage
of individuals in a country aged 25 or older that have tertiary education.
There are some issues that arise with using the Barro and Lee (2013) dataset. The ideal
data reports the exact percentage of native-born individuals in a country that have tertiary ed-
ucation, this would be the proportion of high skilled labour in a country. The Barro and Lee
(2013) dataset does not distinguish between native-born and immigrants when assigning their
educational attainment statistics; it is not uncommon for the United Nations population data
which they base their estimates on to include both immigrants and native-born individuals. Un-
fortunately, they do not detail for which countries this is the case. I assume that the educational
attainment statistics assigned by Barro and Lee (2013) to each country are not affected in a sig-
nificant way by the inclusion of immigrants. This could arise because the data used to assign
2Geodesic is the shortest possible line between two points on a sphere
3The most recent year possible with the data available
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educational attainment in a country rarely includes immigrants or another alternative is that
the distribution of educational attainment is the same for both immigrants and native-born.4
It could also be that the inclusion of both immigrants and native-born individuals does occur
frequently and in response one could calibrate the model to the high skilled native, migrant
mix.
Table (2.1) lists the top 10 destination countries for migrants in my sample and provides
statistics on the share of immigrants, emigrants for each country. Table (2.1) also contains
descriptive statistics on the distance traveled by immigrants and emigrants. Several interesting
patterns arise from these simple summary statistics. Perhaps unsurprisingly for a list of the
top 10 migrant destination countries, there are several countries where the immigrant share
of the population is large; foreign-born in Australia and Canada make up over 20% of the
population. Several countries exhibit large immigrant and emigrant shares as a percentage of
population. Russia’s stock of 13,677,467 immigrants accounts for 9.57% of the population,
but once the stock of emigrants is accounted for the net population gain from migration is
less than 7%. A similar pattern exists for the United Kingdom, with an immigrant share of
11.75% and an emigrant share of 6.51%, in a world where there was no migration in the United
Kingdom their population would be change by less than 5%. The impact of immigration on
the labour market outcomes of countries that exhibit both high immigration and emigration
will be different from countries with only high immigration or emigration rates. The labour
market outcomes will also be different depending on whether the emigrants leaving a country
and immigrants entering that country are similar in skills.
4This seems unlikely, there is a lot of documented evidence on positive selection
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Table 2.1: Migration Statistics: Top 10 Destination Countries
Country
Stock of
Immigrants
Immigrant
Share of
Population
Emigrant
Share of
Population
Avg.
Dist.(km)
Immigrant
Traveled
Avg.
Dist.(km)
Emigrant
Traveled
United States 41,307,385 13.35% 0.55% 4791 5297
Russian Federation 13,677,467 9.57% 2.83% 1646 2534
Germany 10,350,815 12.66% 4.85% 1674 3540
United Kingdom 7,373,907 11.75% 6.51% 3809 8478
Canada 6,859,385 20.17% 4.08% 6920 2247
France 6,818,647 10.49% 2.37% 2369 2666
Australia 6,013,093 27.29% 2.37% 12,934 13,769
Spain 5,113,275 10.98% 2.07% 5129 3724
Italy 4,489,457 7.57% 4.18% 2779 4900
South Africa 2,846,897 5.58% 1.25% 3897 10,017
Notes: Using 2010 data sourced from the OECD DOIC-E Migration Database
Table 2.2: Migration Statistics: Top 10 Source Countries
Country
Stock of
Emigrants
Immigrant
Share of
Population
Emigrant
Share of
Population
Avg.
Dist.(km)
Immigrant
Traveled
Avg.
Dist.(km)
Emigrant
Traveled
Mexico 11,343,114 0.52% 9.67% 4557 3419
United Kingdom 3,855,045 11.75% 6.14% 3809 8478
Russian Federation 3,758,557 9.57% 2.63% 1646 2534
Germany 3,639,715 12.66% 4.45% 1674 3540
Poland 3,277,180 1.55% 8.61% 1066 2533
Romania 2,644,179 0.52% 13.06% 1138 2284
Turkey 2,585,281 2.13% 3.57% 1193 2492
Italy 2,387,429 7.57% 4.03% 2779 4900
Portugal 1,599,694 7.66% 15.13% 5089 3172
United States 1,488,050 13.35% 0.48% 4791 5297
Notes: Using 2010 data sourced from the OECD DOIC-E Migration Database
The statistics on distance traveled in Table (2.1) also yield some interesting points. In some
countries immigrants and emigrants traveled similar distances, the United States and France
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being two examples. In other countries the distance traveled by immigrants and emigrants is
radically different. For example, Canadians emigrating abroad traveled an average of 2247km
whereas immigrants traveling into Canada traveled an average of 6920km; a distance three
times as far. I measure distance between countries using the geodesic distance between coun-
tries as a proxy for establishing the cost of migrating between countries. Simple intuition
suggests that the larger the distance between countries the larger the cost of migrating.
Table (2.2) lists the top 10 source countries for migrants in my sample and provides statis-
tics on the share of immigrants, emigrants for each country. Five countries, the United King-
dom, Russian Federation, Germany, Italy and the United States appear on both top 10 lists.
Mexico has the largest emigrant population in the world and over three times the number of
emigrants as the second largest source country, the United Kingdom. Mexican emigration is
concentrated heavily in the United States; 99% of Mexican emigrants reside in the United
states. High skilled Mexican emigrants are more dispersed but are still highly concentrated in
the U.S., 89% reside in the United States compared to 99% for low skilled workers. Combined,
immigration from Mexico accounts for 27% of the total stock of U.S. immigrants.
There exists strong regional migration patterns in the migration data: 61% of European
emigrants choose to reside in another European country and 94% of OECD emigrants reside
in another OECD country. Non-OECD to non-OECD migration is less common. Only 22% of
immigrants originating from a non-OECD country reside in another non-OECD country.
To estimate the model I require information on the migration costs potential migrants face
when deciding which country to reside in. Mayer and Zignago (2011) compile a dataset that is
useful for trying to capture the costs of migrating. Their dataset contains the geodesic distance
in kilometers between capital cities, information on linguistic similarity between countries,5
and whether two countries share a border. The bilateral differences across countries in these
characteristics will form migration costs that consumers face. Details for this procedure are
found in the next section.
5Languages spoken by at least 20% of the population in both countries
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One of the major differences between my analysis and work done by others is the inclusion
of many non-OECD countries as possible migration destinations.6 It is therefore important to
understand the criteria we used to include or exclude countries from our sample to arrive at the
83 countries I use in my model. There were some limiting factors that affected the inclusion of
countries in our model. First, I restrict the sample to those countries with a meaningful presence
of either emigration or immigration. For a country to be included in my model it had to have
at least 0.025% of the combined worldwide immigrant or emigrant stock, which was roughly
60,000 in 2010. For example, Palau, an island nation with a stock of immigrants totaling 5,776
and a stock of emigrants totaling 7,971 was not included in my sample. Countries removed
under this fashion tended to be very small in size; there would be little to gain by including
these countries and would only serve to add more computational burden to the estimation
process. Secondly, I removed countries for which the OECD DIOC-E had no data on bilateral
migration.
2.4 Calibration
Before going over my estimation procedure it is valuable to discuss the parameters that I take
from the literature and how the sensitivity of my results can be affected by these parameters.
The elasticity of substitution parameters needed in the production function, σs and σx, are
taken as given from the labour literature. These parameters are important for understanding
the effects of migration because they determine the degree of substitutability between different
groups of workers, which in turn affects their wages. By choosing well established parame-
ters found in the literature I am able to focus on the main crux of this paper, solving for the
migration decisions of consumers in a general equilibrium environment.
For the elasticity of substitution across skill types, σs, I use a value of 3. This is the value
estimated by Katz and Murphy (1992), and more recently by Ottaviano and Peri (2012). The
6See O¨rn B. Bodvarsson and den Berg (2013) Section 3.2.7 Evidence on Worldwide Migration
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value I assign for σx, the substitutability between natives and migrants is 10, a value taken from
Manacorda, Manning and Wadsworth (2012). These parameters influence the strength of the
wage impact that migration has on native-born stayers. For example, following an increase in
the labour supply of immigrant workers, a higher substitutability, represented by a higher σs,
between immigrant and native-born workers in production leads to a larger negative impact on
the wages of native-born workers.
It should be noted that these elasticities of substitution are estimated using mostly U.S. data,
and it can be debated whether it is appropriate to assign these same values to immigrants from
all 82 other countries. One possible solution to lessen this problem would be to estimate a small
number of region specific elasticities. For example, immigration into south Asian countries is
mostly from other south Asian countries and therefore the substitutability between natives and
immigrants, σx, of this region could potentially be higher than the elasticity of substitution
used between migrants and natives in the U.S.
2.4.1 Calibration Procedure
The model is estimated following a four step procedure. The first step is to assign the bilateral
cost of migrating to every country in my model. To estimate this NxN system I make an
initial guess of the migration costs that workers face and construct cˆ jns. In the second step I
assign a TFP value for each country where the TFP values for each country are adjusted such
that in equilibrium the differences between the ratio of GDP/Capita relative to the U.S. in the
model and the ratio of GDP/Capita relative to the U.S. found in the data are minimized. The
counterfactual experiment that I conduct will use the TFP values that satisfy this condition.
The third step is to solve an individuals maximization problem by choosing n over the set of
all possible destination countries, given the migration costs from step 1, TFP values for each
country as well an initial vector of wages and prices. I solve this system of non-linear equations
by adjusting prices in each country until the goods and labour markets clear. Finally I compare
the moments from our model with the moments in the data and adjust the vector of migration
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costs until I minimize the squared distance between the model and data moments.
The migration costs that workers face to be contingent on the source-destination country
pair and the skill level of the prospective migrant,
c jns = αs0 + α
s
1d jn + α
s
2L jn + α
s
3EEA jn + α
s
4B jn
where, dn j is the geodisc distance between country j and country n, Ln j is a dummy variable
indicating whether the two countries share a similar language,7 EEAn j is a dummy variable
indicating whether the two countries are in the European Economic Area, and B jn is a dummy
variable indicating whether the two countries share a land border.
I calibrate the migration cost parameters, {αs}, via Simulated Method of Moments match-
ing the following moments: migrants as a percentage of the world population, average distance
travelled, proportion of language similarity migration, proportion of EEA migration, and pro-
portion of contiguous migration; calculated separately by skill level.
2.4.2 Model Fit
Table (2.3) shows the calibrated migration cost parameters results from the Simulated Method
of Moments procedure outlined in Section (2.4.1). My findings on the determinants of migra-
tion are consistent with the literature: the cost of migrating increases with the distance between
the two countries and migrating to a country of a similar language reduces the cost of migrat-
ing. Furthermore, migrating to the EEA is less costly for EEA member country migrants, more
so if the source and destination country share a land border. I use these estimates to construct
the costs that workers face in migrating abroad.
The model does a very good job at matching the targeted moments in the data. For example,
the model’s predictions for the number of migrants, average distance travelled by migrants,
and the proportion of migration between countries of similar language match the observed data
720% of the population in both countries speak the same language
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quite well. Table (2.4) contains the goodness of fit for all 10 matched moments.
Table 2.3: Model Parameters
High Skilled Low Skilled
α0 (Fixed Cost) 4.8002 2.3747
α1 (d jn) 0.3622 0.7568
α2 (L jn) -1.2874 -1.5287
α3 (EEA jn) -0.4199 -0.1536
α4 (B jn) -0.3150 -0.8809
Notes: Migration parameters estimated using the
Simulated Method of Moments procedure outlined
in this section.
Table 2.4: Model Fit
High Skilled Low Skilled
Data Model Data Model
Migrants as % of Population 4.01% 4.00% 1.75% 1.74%
Average Distance Traveled (km) 6239 6279 5325 5451
Proportion of Language Similarity Migration 33.64% 35.10% 32.43% 34.06%
Proportion of EEA Migration 13.62% 15.45% 12.91% 11.93%
Proportion of Contiguous Migration 11.31% 12.57% 20.72% 23.04%
2.5 Results
The main counterfactual experiment is one where I undo world migration and study the con-
sequences on wages and output in a world where all immigrants are sent back to their country
of origin. Now the population in country n will be the individuals in country n where it was
optimal to stay plus all individuals born in n but where it was optimal to move to some country
j.
Nn =
∑
s
∑
j
1{n∗jns=n} +
∑
s
∑
j
1{n∗ins,n})
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What makes my analysis unique is that I am able to go beyond the traditional examination
of undoing migration into only OECD countries and examine the consequences of undoing
migration into non-OECD countries as well. Table (2.5) shows the effect on the average wages
of natives who stayed in their country of origin compared with the no migration case. Where
average wages in a country is equal to,
w¯n =
∑
j
∑
s
∑
x
δ jns ∗ N js ∗ wx jns∑
j
δ jns ∗ N js
A negative value indicates that native stayers are worse off in the counterfactual world of
no migration. We see from Table (2.5) that there is a differential wage effect for high and
low skilled workers in both OECD and non-OECD countries from migration. In a world of
no migration, high skilled workers see a larger decrease in their wages relative to low skilled
workers in non-OECD countries. This is due to the large proportion of high skilled workers
in non-OECD countries being constrained to stay in their country of origin. In a world with
migration, the high skilled workers that remained benefited from the large outflow of high
skilled workers. High skilled emigration, often to OECD destinations, placed upward pressure
on the wages of high skilled native workers that remained. The wages of low skilled workers
in non-OECD were negligibly affected by the no migration counterfactual.
The only group to see relatively large gains to their wages in a world with no migration
are low skilled workers in OECD countries. The large inflow, in absolute terms, of low skilled
workers from non-OECD countries put downward pressure on the wages of low skilled workers
in OECD countries. In our no-migration counterfactual, the low skilled OECD workers benefit
from having less compeititon from foreign, low skilled labour.
In a study of the consequences of undoing world migration into OECD countries, authors
Di Giovanni, Levchenko and Ortega (2015) find an average loss of 2.38% in welfare for OECD
countries, an amount similar to ours. They also find an average loss of 2.0% for non-OECD
countries, whereas I find a much smaller change on average. This could be explained by the
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fact that in their model there is never migration into non-OECD countries, and their inclu-
sion of remittances. For both OECD and non-OECD countries there is a negative effect on
GDP/Capita, in the range of 2-7%.
Table 2.5: Worldwide Migration Counterfactual
% ∆ High Skill
Wages
% ∆ Low Skill
Wages
% ∆ GDP
per Capita
OECD -0.92% 0.35% -6.74%
Non-OECD -0.50% 0.06% -2.28%
Notes: A negative number means that the average wage of a high skilled
native stayer in an OECD country was 0.92% higher in a world with
migration
Table 2.6: European Union Membership Expansion Counterfactual
% ∆ High Skill
Wages
% ∆ Low Skill
Wages
% ∆ GDP
per Capita
Europe with Turkey -2.10% -6.51% -5.60%
Europe without Turkey* -0.01% 0.01% -0.01%
Notes: A negative number means that the average wage of a high skilled native stayer
in an European country was 2.10% higher in * For this row of calculations I do not
include Turkey. I do still account for Turkish migrants in the rest of the EU
My second counterfactual experiment is one where I grant Turkey,8 a country currently on
track for European Union membership, the full benefits of being a member state of the EU.
Turkey has a population of over 70 million, 10% of which are considered high skilled. This
is comparable to the United Kingdom or Germany in population size and Portugal in skill
composition. In our model the benefits of being a member state of the EU takes the form of a
cost reducing parameter for citizens migrating within the European Economic Area. Following
Turkey’s accession into the EEA, the model predicts that migration into other EEA countries
from Turkey increases by 22%. The impact of this increased immigration is shown in Table
(2.6). The results show that the wages of native European stayers are negatively affected by
8Turkey was chosen because it has the largest economy and population of all EU candidate countries
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Turkey joining the EU; the average wage of a native European stayer falls between 2-7%. This
is primarily due to Turkey having a large population who on average are earning a wage below
the EU average. When we compare wages of workers in Europe accounting for this compo-
sitional effect we see very little changes in average wages across both skill groups; European
workers react to the increase in Turkish migrants by sorting to other European countries, in-
cluding Turkey. Immigration into Turkey from the rest of Europe increases by 29%, migration
into other European countries from European workers and migration into Europe from the rest
of the world falls slightly. The multi-country general equilibrium framework is central to this
result. Consumers’ in Europe and abroad react to the changing EEA landscape and mitigate
much of the wage impact following Turkey’s inclusion into the EEA. A model that only al-
lowed for exogenous movements in migration has the potential to overstate the negative effects
of Turkey’s inclusion into the EU.
In my last counterfactual I simulate the migration response of consumers in Europe and
the rest of the world to the United Kingdom leaving the EU and no longer being part of the
EEA, commonly referred to as Brexit. The economic fallout for the United Kingdom and the
rest of Europe following Brexit has been discussed extensively in the popular media and in
academic journals and the likely fall in immigration to the UK is seen as a large, if not the
largest, economic cost of Brexit (Economist, 2017; Wadsworth et al., 2016; Breinlich et al.,
2016). In contrast to these papers, the structure of my model allows me to model the migration
decision of workers in response to Brexit and measure the impact on the real wages and GDP
of the UK. I find that the impact on wages is relatively small, as shown in Table (2.7), wages
of native-born stayers are barely affected. Additionally, the wages of high-skilled workers in
the United Kingdom fall by 0.12% and the wages of low-skilled workers increase by 0.08%.
Similar to the previous counterfactual, in the steady state, workers from across Europe react
to the United Kingdom leaving the EEA and mitigate the wage impact from Brexit in the
rest Europe. The loss in migration from the rest of Europe is offset by less Britons leaving;
migration into Europe from the United Kingdom falls by 22% and migration from the rest of
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Europe, particularly from Central and Eastern Europe, into the United Kingdom falls by 20%.
Conversely, migration into the United Kingdom from outside the EEA and migration within
the remaining EEA countries increases slightly.
Table 2.7: Brexit: European Union Membership Contraction
% ∆ High
Skill Wages
% ∆ Low-Skill
Wages
% ∆ GDP per
Capita
European Economic Area* 0.01% -0.01% -0.02%
Notes: *Comparing average wages in all EEA countries following the United Kingdom’s departure
from the EU not including the UK.
2.6 Conclusion
As international migration increases, understanding the labour market consequences becomes
more important. I assessed the impact from migration and analyzed the determinants of migra-
tion using a simple model of income maximization embedded in a general equilibrium model.
The model framework incorporates many of the important features of the world economy and
empirical studies of international migration. There exists labour productivity differences across
countries, worker heterogeneity in productivity across skill types, and between working in your
country of birth or abroad, as well as country-pair and skill specific costs of migration. Though
I try and account for all the important features of the world economy and international migra-
tion, this model is still only a simplification of an incredibly complex decision making process
of individuals deciding to relocate to another part of the world, oftentimes thousands of miles
away, with little or no guarantee on what the outcome might be. However, the complexity of the
problem should not dissuade us from pursuing it, especially when the number of international
migrants now number some 232 million.
My analysis suggests that, on average, individuals in both OECD and non-OECD countries
are better off due to international migration. Additional research on the robustness of this
result are avenues for future study. For example, remittances sent home by migrants provides a
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substantial boost to the income of those in the source country. The Philippines, a country with
4 million emigrants, sees remittance inflows equivalent to 15% of their GDP. Since I only look
at the change in real wages due to migration and not income; I may have underestimated the
benefits of migration, especially for countries that have high levels of remittances. My analysis
also does not take into account any possible effects migrants have on a countrys productivity;
the labour market outcomes from migration may be different if we endogenize TFP. Lastly,
my analysis of the determinants of migration ignores the social, political, and cultural factors
that undoubtedly enter into the decision making process of a potential migrant. As more data
becomes available in this literature the inclusion of these components becomes possible.
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Chapter 3
The Trade-Creation Effect of Migrants: a
Multi-country General Equilibrium
Analysis
3.1 Introduction
The admission criteria for immigrants vary among countries: some emphasize family reunifi-
cation, some are based on a points system, while others use a variety of other criteria. Likewise,
the proportion of the population accounted for by immigrants differs considerably across coun-
tries. Differences in the rates of migration across countries and in the rules governing who can
enter, are dependent on whether migration is perceived to have a positive or negative impact
on the welfare of native-born workers in those countries. This welfare impact will depend in
part on how firm production and export decisions change in response to the scale and source-
country composition of migrants in their country.
In a series of papers on international trade and migration networks, Rauch (1999) and
Rauch and Trindade (2002) show migrant networks can play a key role in overcoming infor-
mational barriers to international trade by acting as intermediaries between firms across coun-
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tries. Lower trade costs due to migration influence export sales to a country by i) increasing the
sales of existing exporting firms and ii) influencing the number of firms that find it profitable
to export, I will refer to these effects as the trade-creation effects of migration.
Empirical studies on the trade-creation effects conducted in the United States, Canada,
Spain, France, and the United Kingdom have revealed consistent results; a 10% increase in
immigrants from a particular source country is associated with a 1-3% increase in exports to
that country (Gould, 1994; Head and Ries, 1999; Peri and Requena-Silvente, 2010). Thus,
the extent to which migration reduces trade costs will impact consumer welfare by affecting
the amount and range of differentiated products that can be purchased locally or imported for
consumption. The main objective of this paper is to quantitatively assess the aggregate impact
of migration via this trade-creation channel and gauge its relative importance in contributing to
the overall welfare impact from the currently observed levels of migration. To the best of my
knowledge, I provide the first set of quantitative results showing that the welfare contribution
of the trade-creation effect of migration is important, particularly for countries with high rates
of emigration and a diaspora spread among many countries.
To quantify the migration trade-creation mechanism, I develop a multi-country general
equilibrium model where the decision of consumers on where to migrate and the decision of
firms on which markets to serve interact. Firms sell goods in all markets that are profitable, and
operate in a monopolistic competition market structure with heterogeneity in firm productivity
as in Melitz (2003) and Chaney (2008). Consumers work where they can earn the highest real
income net of migration costs. The wage they earn at a location depends on their skill type, the
degree of complementary between worker skill types, and changes in the labor supply coming
from immigration and emigration9. These decisions are integrated because where firms choose
to sell their goods affects real income in a location which in turn affects a consumer’s decision
to migrate. Similarly, firm export decisions are affected by consumer migration decisions be-
9These are common features in the nested constant elasticity of substitution models of labor demand and
supply used in the literature that investigates the migration impact on the wages of native-born workers (Borjas,
2003; Ottaviano and Peri, 2012).
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cause where consumers choose to settle lowers the costs for firms selling to their country of
origin. The importance of this interaction depends on the responsiveness of firm trade costs to
migration flows. Using the model equation of bilateral trade flows, I estimate the elasticity of
exports with respect to standard variables in the gravity trade literature augmented with migra-
tion variables. I use these estimates to construct bilateral trade costs, which are dependent on
the number of immigrants and emigrants for each source-destination country pair.
In addition to the trade-creation effect, migration impacts consumer welfare in a country
through a labor market effect on nominal wages and a market size effect on aggregate de-
mand for goods. I assess the total welfare effects of migration by comparing welfare under the
observed levels of migration to a counterfactual scenario with no migration. I compare the eco-
nomic outcome of this no-migration scenario to the baseline scenario generated by the model
to determine the winners and losers from international migration. Native-born stayers in at-
tractive migration destinations such as Canada and the United States have had overall, positive
welfare gains from international migration, 6% and 4.5% respectively. Native-born stayers in
traditional emigrant source countries such as Mexico, Poland, and Portugal have had welfare
losses, with an overall decline in welfare of around 2% each.
The welfare changes to consumers from migration originate from three sources i) labor
market effects due to changes in nominal wages ii) firm entry and exit stemming from market
size effects, and iii) trade-creation effects due to changes in firm export behaviour. Labor mar-
ket effects result from immigrants putting downward pressure on the wages of workers with
similar characteristics and upward pressure on the wages of workers with different character-
istics. For example, low skilled Mexican immigration into the United States will increase the
wages of high skilled American workers but reduce the wages of low skilled American work-
ers. Changes to the market size alters aggregate demand in a country which affects firm entry
decisions and therefore the varieties available for consumption. In the case of United States,
the increase in the population due to immigration induces firm entry in the domestic American
market which increases the set of varieties produced in the United States, resulting in a lower
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price level and higher real income for American consumers.
My focus in this paper is on the third channel; how changes to bilateral trade costs affects
firm entry and exit decisions. Of the three transmission channels, this is the only one where
the source country composition of the immigrants in a country explicitly matters for how firms
will respond. To isolate the impact of the trade-creation channel, I consider a counterfactual in
which trade costs do not depend on migration and compare the results to the baseline results.
For Canada, the United States, and Mexico the results are similar; this channel is quantitatively
small because the behaviour of exporting firms in this set of countries, is roughly the same in the
model with all three channels present and one with the trade-creation effect of migration shut
down. Furthermore, for the United States and Canada, the welfare contribution of importing
additional varieties at a lower cost is small compared to the labor market and market size
welfare gains resulting from the large increase in population from immigration.
For countries with large diasporas distributed among many countries such as Portugal and
Poland this channel is more pronounced. Welfare losses under the current levels of migration
compared to the no-migration counterfactual worsen from -1.24% to -3.00% and -2.44% to
-3.54%, for Portugal and Poland respectively, if the trade-creation channel of migration is
ignored. In contrast to Canada, the United States, and Mexico, the decisions of firms serving
Portugal and Poland depends in a large way on the diaspora reducing the costs of foreign firms
exporting there. The trade creation effect mitigates some of the loss in welfare stemming from
the labor market and market size effects.
This paper relates to the large literature that evaluates the economic impact of migration.
Ottaviano and Peri (2012), Card (2009), Aydemir and Borjas (2007), and Borjas (2003) docu-
ment the effects of large scale migration on the nominal wages of native workers in the United
States. These studies use an aggregate production function that parameterizes the elasticity of
substitution between different types of workers where the labor input is a constant elasticity of
substitution composite of different types of labor (e.g. low skilled and high skilled). In this
framework immigrants put downward pressure on the wages of workers with similar charac-
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teristics and upward pressure on the wages of workers with different characteristics. Similar to
these papers, the effect of a particular labor supply shock on the nominal wages of native-born
workers in my model will depend on the elasticity of substitution between worker types and
the size of the inflow of each worker type.
In addition to Gould (1994), Head and Ries (1999), and Peri and Requena-Silvente (2010)
that study the aggregate relationship between country level trade flows and migration flows,
my paper also complements the empirical literature that uses firm-level data to investigate the
importance of source-country immigrant composition on export outcomes. Using firm-level
data from Portugal Bastos and Silva (2012) find that larger levels of Portuguese emigrants in a
particular destination increases firm export participation and export intensity to those locations.
This paper is most closely related to recent work that quantifies the impact of migration on
consumer welfare using general equilibrium models with market size effects. Iranzo and Peri
(2009) introduce endogenous product variety in a two-country model of migration to explore
the welfare effects of a large movement of skilled migration from Eastern Europe to Western
Europe. This increases total production of the differentiated consumption goods which the
remaining workers in Eastern Europe can purchase via trade. Di Giovanni, Levchenko and
Ortega (2015) implement a similar framework and calibrate a general equilibrium model to
match world income and trade patterns for a set of 60 countries that also features bilateral
remittances and distinguishes between the short-run and long-run effects of migration. More
recently, Aubry, Burzyn´ski and Docquier (2016) expanded the literature to also include the
contribution that migrants make to national budgets and social transfers. In these studies,
countries with higher stocks of migrants, such as Canada and Australia, benefit the most from
migration while countries with high emigration rates, such as Poland and Mexico, on average,
have welfare losses from migration. While my findings exhibit this general relationship, in
my work I show that the source country composition of migrants matters when measuring the
economic impact of the market size channel.
The contribution of this paper is to highlight the importance of migration in determining
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bilateral trade flows, this introduces a new transmission channel by which migration affects
welfare in a country. Additionally, compared to these papers, I endogenize the migration deci-
sion of individuals and estimate trade costs that are dependent on migration flows. This allows
me to test the sensitivity of migration decisions to changes in trade costs. In a trade-cost reduc-
tion counterfactual I find that the benefits of lower trade costs for a country depends critically
on whether the population increased or decreased following the policy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section (3.2), I develop the model. Section
(3.3) discusses the quantitative construction of the model. In Section (3.4), I present my data
sources and the estimation results. Section (3.5) presents the counterfactual experiments for
the main welfare results. Finally, Section (3.6) concludes.
3.2 Model Framework
There are J countries, indexed j = 1, ..., J. The starting population of workers of skill type s in
country j is denoted by Z js. Consumers derive utility by consuming goods from two sectors;
N denotes the non-traded sector and T the traded sector. Both are made of a continuum of
differentiated goods. Consumer c born in country i makes a decision to migrate to country j
based on the real wage net the costs of migrating that they will receive. The bilateral costs of
migration I estimate will depend on standard determinants of migration flows such as distance
and language similarity between countries.
3.2.1 Consumer Preferences
A consumer is characterized by their skill type s ∈ {H, L} and country of origin j. Consumers
of skill type s residing in j inelastically supply one unit of labor and earn wage w js. Consumer
preferences are Cobb-Douglas in the CES aggregates of sectors g {N, T }. Consumer c that is
residing in country j with income w js maximizes,
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max
qTj (ω),q
N
j (ω)

∫
ωΩTj
qTj (ω)
σT −1
σT dω
 σ
T
σT −1µ
T

∫
ωΩNj
qNj (ω)
σT −1
σT dω
 σ
N
σN−1µ
N
s.t.
∫
ωΩTj
qTj (ω) p
T
j (ω) dω +
∫
ωΩNj
qNj (ω)p
N
j (ω)dω ≤ w js
qgj (ω) is the quantity consumed of good ω belonging to sector g = N,T in country j, and Ω
g
j
is the mass of varieties available in sector g. µT and µN are the share of tradeables and non-
tradeables in consumption and σg is the elasticity of substitution between varieties in sectors
N and T.
In this framework, the welfare of workers in j are affected by migration via the impact that
migrants have on prices pgj , nominal wages w js, and the set of goods Ω
g
j . The set of goods avail-
able in j, ΩTj will also change due to trade costs; higher trade costs between countries results in
less goods being traded and less varieties of goods available for consumers. Whereas, markets
easily accessible to other countries will have a larger set of goods available for consumption.
Standard optimization leads to an expression of indirect utility for a consumer with wage w js
that equals,
V js =
w js(
PTj
)µT (
PNj
)µN (3.1)
Welfare increases with a fall in the price level
(
PTj
)µT (
PNj
)µN
, which is decreasing in the
number of varieties available for consumption in j. Where Pgj is the price index in sector
g = N,T in country j,
Pgj =

∫
ωΩ
g
j
pgj(ω)
1−σgd(ω)

1
1−σg
(3.2)
3.2. Model Framework 37
3.2.2 Consumer Migration Decision
Consumer c residing in country i makes a decision on which country j to reside in by solving,
max
j
V∗ci js = ln
(
V js
)
− ln
(
ti js
)
+ εci j (3.3)
where εci j is an idiosyncratic shock for consumer c born in i migrating to j and ti js is the cost
of migrating between countries i and j for a consumer of skill type s. Following McFadden
(1974), I assume εci j is i.i.d across countries i and j and follows a type 1 extreme value distri-
bution. This yields the following expression for the probability a consumer born in i of skill s
chooses to reside in j:
δi js = Pr
[
V∗ci js = maxk
V∗ciks
]
= Pr
[
V∗ci js > V
∗
ci− js
]
=
V js
ti js∑
k
(
Vks
tiks
) (3.4)
ti js is meant to capture the barriers that individuals face in migrating. Using standard proxies
from the migration literature: distance, language similarity, membership in a free movement of
persons agreement, and contiguity between countries will form the determinants of migration
costs ti js (Mayda, 2010; Clark, Hatton and Williamson, 2007; Borjas, 1987). Everything else
being equal, a lower ti js between countries i and j for a worker of skill s leads to a higher
probability of migrating, δi js.
Mi js denotes the number of workers of skill type s in country j originating from country i
after migration and Zis denotes the starting population of each worker skill type in country i.
Mi js = δi jsZis (3.5)
Summing over all source countries i gives the total amount of labor available in j of skill
type s.
L js = Σ
i
Mi js (3.6)
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where L js is also the labour supplied in country j of skill s that is usable by firms in production.
3.2.3 Firm Technology
Firms operate in a monopolistic competition market structure as in Melitz (2003) and Chaney
(2008). Firms are heterogeneous in their productivity and incur a fixed cost when they enter
the domestic or tradeable sector. For each country j and sector g the mass of entrants, egj
is endogenous. Potential firms must pay a cost fe to obtain a productivity draw ϕ from the
productivity distribution. f Nj j is the fixed cost of producing the non-tradeable good in country j
and f Tji is the fixed cost of selling the tradeable good in country i for a firm operating in country
j. If a firm in j is exporting goods in sector T to consumers in i they also incur an iceberg
per-unit cost that is dependent on the number of immigrants and emigrants between countries
j and i, τTji
(
M jis, Mi j
)
. M jis and Mi js are endogenous objects of the model that reflect the the
optimal migration decisions of consumers.
Firms produce using skilled and low-skilled labor. A firm located in country j producing
goods in sector T for i , j with productivity ϕ and facing demand for its good from consumers
in country i, qTji (ϕ), solves,
min
L jH (ϕ) , L jL (ϕ) w jHL jH (ϕ) + w jLL jL (ϕ) + f Tji
s.t A jϕ
(
θHL
η−1
η
jH (ϕ) + θLL
η−1
η
jL (ϕ)
) η
η−1
= τTji
(
M jis, Mi js
)
qTji (ϕ)
The effective labor force in j is given by a CES aggregate of high and low skilled labor.
L j =
(
θHL
η−1
σ
jH + θLL
η−1
σ
jL
) η
η−1
θH and θL capture the relative importance of skilled and low skilled labor in production.
Skilled and unskilled workers are imperfect substitutes in production, where η is the elasticity
of substitution across skill types.
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Katz and Murphy (1992) first showed the importance of modeling skilled and unskilled
labor as imperfect substitutes in production to understand the impact of changes in labor supply
on the wages of workers. In my setting high skilled migrants put downward pressure on wages
of high skilled native-born workers and upward pressure on the wages of low skilled native-
born workers. I assume that immigrant and native workers are perfect substitutes within skill
groups, meaning there are no differences in productivity between immigrants and native-born
workers of the same skill level. Perfect substitutability between immigrant and native workers
within skill groups results in a larger negative impact on the wages of high skilled native-born
workers compared to a setting where the two groups are not perfectly substitutable.
There is mixed evidence on the substitutability between immigrant and native-born work-
ers. Using U.S., Canadian, and Mexican data Aydemir and Borjas (2007) show that immigrant
and native-born workers are perfect substitutes in production. Whereas Ottaviano and Peri
(2012) find a less than perfect substitutability between immigrant and native workers, albeit a
small one. Di Giovanni, Levchenko and Ortega (2015) compare the welfare outcomes from
migration under scenarios where immigrant and native labor are both perfect substitutes and
imperfect substitutes in production and find that the results are robust to either specification.
Nonetheless, in both cases aggregate labor supply in j will still be affected by the skill com-
position of immigrant workers residing in j. Differences in aggregate labor supply across
countries form from differences in the proportion of high and low skilled native labor and the
skill composition of immigrants residing in j.
The composite wage in country j,
∼
w j, represents the minimized cost of one unit of effective
labour in country j is given by,
∼
w j =
(
θ
η
Hw
1−η
jH + θ
η
Lw
1−η
jL
) 1
1−η
Changes in the nominal wage from migration affect native-stayers directly by increasing
or decreasing their nominal wage but also in the variety of goods available for consumption.
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Changes to the skill distribution in j as a result of migration will alter the wages of workers in j
and subsequently the cost of production for firms located in j. For example, higher production
costs abroad stemming from increases in
∼
w j leads to less varieties available to import in j,
increasing the domestic price level and lowering real income.
The solution to this firm problem shows that the cost of a firm located in j faces in selling
q goods to destination i is divided into two components: a variable cost and a fixed cost,
cTji(q) =
∼
w jτTji
(
M jis, Mi js
)
A jϕ︸                ︷︷                ︸
Variable Cost
q +
Fixed Cost︷︸︸︷
f Tji (3.7)
In addition to the composite wage, the variable cost component also includes τTji
(
M jis, Mi js
)
,
where τTji
(
M jis, Mi js
)
> 1 for any j , i and τTji
(
M jis, Mi js
)
= 1∀ j.10 f Tji is the fixed cost a
firm faces when entering market i from j. Firm specific productivity ϕ is drawn from a Pareto
distribution with shape parameter γ, the corresponding CDF of ϕ is G(ϕ) = 1 −
(
1
ϕ
)γ
and the
PDF is g(ϕ) = γϕ−1−γ. As a consequence of the heterogeneity in productivity and the presence
of fixed costs of exporting not all firms will find it profitable to sell to all markets. There will be
different productivity requirements to enter different markets and given that firm productivity
is constant, only changes in the variable or fixed costs can alter a firm’s decision to enter a
market. For example, lower production costs in j due to a decrease in
∼
w j leads to, everything
else equal, more varieties available to export from country j. Countries that receive these new
goods see a decrease in the price level of their tradeable sector and an increase in real income.
The trade inducing immigrant effect that I estimate in the model will manifest in the variable
costs that firms face when exporting, specifically in τTji
(
M jis, Mi js
)
.
Firms are price setters and charge a constant mark-up over marginal cost equal to:
pgji(ϕ) =
σg
σg − 1
w˜ jτ
g
ji
(
M jis, Mi js
)
ϕ
10In the non-tradeable sector τNj j = 1 and τ
N
ji = ∞ for any j , i
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Given the optimal pricing decision of firms and consumer demand, the total sales for a firm
in sector g with productivity ϕ is given by,
xgji(ϕ) = p
g
ji(ϕ)q
g
ji(ϕ)
xgji(ϕ) = µ
gYi
 pgji(ϕ)Pgi
1−σ
g
where Ygi = µ
gYi is the total income in country i spent on sector g.
Given prices, total income, and wages across countries there is a solution for the produc-
tivity cutoff for firms in country j must meet to find it profitable to serve sector g in market i.
This cutoff can be obtained by finding the minimum level of productivity that a firm needs to
earn zero profits from serving market i.
Profits for a firm in country j with productivity ϕ serving market i is equal to,
pi
g
ji (ϕ) = p
g
ji (ϕ) q
g
ji (ϕ) − cgji (ϕ) qgju (ϕ) − f gji
pi
g
ji (ϕ) =
xgji(ϕ)
σg
− f gji
Setting pigji(ϕ) = 0 I can solve or the productivity cutoff
−
ϕ
g
ji ,
−
ϕ
g
ji =
∼
w jτ
g
ji
(
M jis, Mi js
)
A jP
g
j
 f gji
∼
w j
Y jA j

1
σh−1 (σg
µg
) 1
σg−1 σg
σg − 1 (3.8)
Equation (3.8) shows that the productivity needed to serve sector g in market i is increasing
in both iceberg and fixed costs, as well as the composite wage. The extent to which migration
adjusts the costs that firms face will matter when I conduct my counterfactual experiments to
evaluate the impact of migration on welfare. For example, a higher number of immigrants
residing in country j from i lowers the cost of exporting for firms located in country j to i.
This will lower the marginal costs that a firm in country j faces to serve market i and leads to
a reduction in the productivity requirement to enter market i and an increase in the number of
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firms exporting from j to i.
Using the standard assumption that the number of firms in each sector g is proportional to a
country’s total income µgY j 11 I can combine (3.2) and (3.8) to solve an expression of the price
index across sectors and countries.
Pgj =

∑
k
egk
∞∫
−
ϕ
g
k j
 σgσg − 1
∼
wkτ
g
k j
(
M jks, Mk js
)
ϕAk

1−σg
dG (ϕ)

1
1−σg
Pgj = λ
− 1γ
2 Y
− 1γ
(γ+1−σg)
σg−1
j Θ j (3.9)
where Θ−γj =
∑
k
Yk
Y
( ∼
wkτ
g
k j
(
M jks, Mk js
)) −γ ( f gk j ∼wk) −1+σg−γσg−1 and λ2 =
(
σg
σg−1
)1−σg
γ
γ+1−σg λ
−1+σg−γ
1
3.2.4 Competitive Equilibrium
A competitive equilibrium is a set of migration decisions
{
Mi js
}J
j=1
∀ i, prices
{
PNj , P
T
j
}J
j=1
,
wages
{
w jH, w jL
}J
j=1
, and mass of firms
{
eNj , e
T
j
}J
j=1
such that consumers maximize their util-
ity, firms maximize profits, the goods and labour markets clear and expected profits from firm
entry are equal to zero. The mass of firms is pinned down by the standard free entry condition,
the cost fe , that a firm pays discover their productivity is equal to the expected profits from
doing so.
3.3 Constructing Costs Using Model Predictions
In this section I outline the model predictions that guide my empirical estimation in Section
(3.4). My strategy is to construct model equations that I can bring to the data to get estimates
of t jis, τTji, f
T
ji , and f
g
j j. I then use the fitted values of these estimates as inputs when solving the
model.
11See Chaney (2008)
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3.3.1 Migration costs t
A challenge with bringing equation (3.5), the predicted level of bilateral migration, to the
data is the limited data on the counterpart V js, real wages of workers in country j of skill
s. Particularly difficult is gathering comparable wage data by skill level for every source and
destination country in my sample. However, following Anderson (2011) I can use the labour
market clearing equations to solve for, and substitute out, the equilibrium wages as follows,
L js = V js
∑
i
1
ti js∑
k
(
Vks
tiks
)Zis
V js =
L js
Φ js
∑
i
Lis
This yields an expression for bilateral migration,
Mi js
L js
=
Zis∑
i
Lis
(
1
ti js
) (
1
Φ jsκis
)
(3.10)
where Φ js =
(∑
i
1
ti js
κi
Zis∑
i
Lis
)
measures how easy it is to enter j for workers with skill s, and κis =∑
k
(
Vks
tiks
)
measures how easy is it leave i for workers with skill s. (3.10) implies that in a friction-
less world, immigrant populations found in j would be found in equal proportion to their share
of the world population: Mi jsL js =
Zis∑
i
Lis
. The degree to which a distortion to this proportion
exists will provide insight on the importance of bilateral migration costs in the consumer’s
migration decision. Following the literature on the determinants of migration (Borjas, 1987;
Grogger and Hanson, 2011; Mayda, 2010) I parameterize migration costs as a function of the
distance between two countries (Di j), and dummy variables for whether the two countries share
a common language (Langi j), a land border (SBi j), or historical colonial ties (Colonyi j),
(
ti js
)−1
= D
αs1
i j e
αs2Langi j+α
s
3S Bi j+α
s
4Colonyi j
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letting Zis
κis
= expS Dis , and L js∑
i, j
LisΦ js
= expDD js I can express migration flows from i to j in a
log-linear form
ln
(
Mi js
)
= αs1ln
(
Di j
)
+ αs2Langi j + α
s
3S Bi j + α
s
4Colonyi j + S Dis + DD js (3.11)
With data on the stocks of bilateral migration by skill level I can estimate equation (3.11)
and use the estimates {αˆs} to construct the migration costs, tˆi js that consumers face when mi-
grating between countries. Details on the estimation procedure for migration costs follows in
Section (3.4).
3.3.2 Firm costs τ and f
The first prediction that I highlight from the firms’ problem is the solution for total export sales
from all firms in country j to country i. Summing over the sales of all firms in country j that
meet the productivity threshold requirement to serve market i,
−
ϕ
T
ji, yields equation (3.12). From
this result, we can see that total export sales between countries depends negatively on both the
variable and fixed costs that firms face.
XTji =
XTi
(
w˜ jτTji(M jis,Mi js)
A j
)−γ
eTj
(
f Tji
)1− γσT −1
Θ
−γ
i
(3.12)
Letting,
(
τTji
)−γ
= Dβ1ji e
β2Lang ji+β3S B ji+β4Colony ji+β5Landlock ji+β6RT A ji Mβ7i jH M
β8
i jLM
β9
jiH M
β10
jiL (3.13)
and µT Y j
( ∼
w j
A j
)−γ
= eλ j , and µT YiΘ
−γ
i = e
λi I can express export sales from j to i in a log-
linear form as
ln
(
XTji
)
= ln
((
τTji
(
M jis,Mi js
))−γ)︸                      ︷︷                      ︸
Parametrization of Variable Cost
+λ j + λi +
(
1 − γ
σT − 1
)
ln
(
f Tji
)
(3.14)
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where (3.13) is a parametrization of the bilateral variable cost, λ j is the fixed effect of the
exporting country, and λi is the fixed effect of the importing country.The variable costs are pa-
rameterized to include the standard variables in the gravity literature augmented with migration
variables.
If I were to estimate (3.14) via OLS in its current form I could not attribute the same
variable to both variable and fixed cost and uniquely identify the impact it has on export sales.
Next, I will show that using the model prediction on the average level of sales of exporting
firms from j to i, I can identify f Tji separately from τ
T
ji. Without this additional step variable
selection would be ad hoc; I have no guidelines to follow to tell us which should be included
in variable cost and not fixed cost.
The average sales of exporting firms from j to i can be written as the total sales from country
j to i divided by the number of exporting firms, where the number of exporting firms is equal
to total number of of firms in j that meet the productivity cutoff of exporting to i,
−
ϕ
T
ji.
12
XTji
NTji
=
µT YiY (w˜ jτTji(M jis,Mi js))−γ( f Tji )1− γσT −1 eTjΘ−γi
(
1
−
ϕ
T
ji
)γ
eTj
which simplifies to,
XTji
NTji
=
(
f Tji
)
1
σT
(
γ
γ+1−σT
)−1 (3.15)
The difficulty in using equation (3.15) to learn about bilateral fixed costs is that there sel-
dom exists bilateral trade data on the number of exporting firms for a reasonably large set of
countries. To overcome this limitation I use a recent database, the OECD Eurostat Trade by
Enterprise Characteristics Database (OECD-TEC), that reports the number of exporting and
importing enterprises for 43 countries.
The empirical literature on the positive relationship between immigration and exporting
12The percentage of firms that will meet the cutoff is calculated as Pr
(
ϕ >
−
ϕ
T
n j
)
=
(
1
−
ϕ
T
n j
)γ
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argues that this relationship exists, in part, due to the impact that immigrants have on reducing
the fixed cost of exporting. However, the Meltiz-type framework I use has a notable implication
for the relationship between fixed costs and average sales, a relationship that is not always
compatible with what is observed in the data. In these types of models, average sales between
countries i and j is increasing in the fixed costs between destination i and source country
j. With higher fixed costs lower productivity firms are unable to profitably export to i. The
firms that do find it profitable to export to i, even in the presence of higher fixed costs, are
more productive and have higher sales than the marginal firm that drops out of exporting.
For example, if following the introduction of a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) between two
countries, average exports between those two countries increase, the model would incorrectly
rationalize that outcome as the FTA increasing the fixed costs of exporting between those
two countries. Due to this inconsistency, I do not parameterize the fixed costs of exporting.
Instead, I infer my estimates of the bilateral fixed costs values f Tji by calculating them directly
from equation (3.16) given values of γ and σT .
fˆ Tji =
XTji
NTji
1
σT
(
γ
γ + 1 − σT
)−1
(3.16)
With these estimates I can now re-specify equation (3.14) as,
ln
(
XTji
)
−
(
1 − γ
σT − 1
)
ln
(
fˆ Tji
)
= β1ln
(
D ji
)
+ β2Lang ji + β3S B ji + β4Colony ji + β5Landlock ji
+β6RT A ji + β7ln
(
Mi jH
)
+ β8ln
(
Mi jL
)
+β9ln
(
M jiH
)
+ β10ln
(
M jiL
)
+ λ j + λi (3.17)
Similarly, using the average sales of domestic firms operating in j, total domestic sales of
firms in j, Xgj j, divided by the number of domestic firms operating in country j, N
g
j j, yields a
formula for f gj j.
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fˆ gj j =
Xgj j
Ngj j
1
σg
(
γ
γ + 1 − σg
)−1
(3.18)
3.4 Data and Estimation
In this section I provide details on the migration and trade data sources I use to estimate the
model equations presented in Section (3.3). Using the estimates of tˆ jis, τˆTji, fˆ
T
ji , and fˆ
g
j j as inputs,
I can solve the model and quantitatively assess the aggregate impact of migration via the three
transmission channels and gauge their relative importance in contributing to the overall welfare
impact from the currently observed levels of migration.
3.4.1 Migration Data
My bilateral migration data decomposed by skill level comes from the OECD Database on
Immigrants in OECD and non-OECD Countries (DIOC-E ). The dataset includes over 80 des-
tination countries and more than 200 countries of origin. I use this database along with edu-
cation attainment data from Barro and Lee (2013) and population data from the World Bank
to construct each country’s initial labour force composition in 2010. I begin with the OECD-
DIOC-E where I have information on the bilateral stock of migrants across countries. Merging
this information with data on country populations from the World Bank I can determine the
proportion of migrants in each country and subtract them to back out the native portion. Lastly,
I assign the high skilled proportion of the native labour force in each country as the percentage
of individuals in a country aged 25 or older that have tertiary education using the educational
attainment statistics found in Barro and Lee (2013).
Table (3.1) presents data on the proportion of population that are immigrants for my set
of 43 countries and the skill distribution of these immigrants. International migration has had
major influences on the labour composition for many countries. In Canada and Australia the
population is 20% foreign-born, and these foreign-born are predominantly high skilled. Sev-
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eral countries exhibit both large immigrant and emigrant shares as a percentage of population.
In the United Kingdom and Greece immigrants account for over 10% of the population, how-
ever because they also have a high emigration rate, their net population gain from migration
falls by half. There also exists large discrepancies in the skill distribution of immigrants and
emigration in a country. Argentina has a modest 4.5% immigration population share, but over
95% of those immigrants are low skilled, whereas the high skilled portion of those that em-
igrate from Argentina is over 65%. The impact of migration on the labour market outcomes
and trade-creation effects for countries will depend critically on the pattern of immigration and
emigration, both the number and skill composition of who enters and leaves.
3.4.2 Trade Data
I use 2010 data from the OECD-TEC on bilateral export sales and the number of exporting
enterprises in the manufacturing industry to construct bilateral average sales and export sales
for each pair of countries in my sample. Theis data is combined with United Nations Indus-
trial Development Organization(UNIDO) data on domestic manufacturing production and the
number of domestic enterprises to estimate the trade equations specified in the Section (3.3).
A unique characteristic of the data is the bilateral information it provides on the number of ex-
porting enterprises, enabling the construction of average export sales for country pairs. Table
(3.2) shows values of average sales from a sample of countries in my dataset where rows cor-
respond to the exporting country.13 Conditional on a firm exporting to a destination, the market
structure I use predicts that fixed costs have no impact on sales to that destination. Fixed costs
only affect average sales by affecting the number of firms exporting to that market. I will pick
up the variation in average sales that comes from the number of firms, for example, Canada and
Mexico have similar levels of export sales to the United States but large differences in averages
sales, due to their large differences in the number of firms that export to the United States.
There exists strong regional patterns in the trade data, both in the value of exports and
13For example, a Canadian firm’s average value of exports to the United States was $8,781,714 in 2010
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number of exporting firms. In North America, trade among Canada, Mexico, and the United
States is highly concentrated among each other.The United States is both Canada and Mexico’s
largest trading partner and the United States exports more to Canada than they do to any other
country. Furthermore, the signing of NAFTA by all three countries in 1993 solidified their
trading relationship. Caliendo and Parro (2015) finds that intra-bloc trade increased by 118%
for Mexico, 11% for Canada, and 41% for the U.S. following the introduction of NAFTA’s
tariff reductions. This translated to a 1.13% increase in welfare for Mexico, a 0.08% increase
for the U.S., and a welfare decline of 0.06% for Canada. In Section (3.5) I model the response
of consumers and firms to further decreases in bilateral trade costs between the three countries.
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Table 3.1: Migration Descriptive Statistics
Country Name
Immigrant
share of
population
High skilled
immigrant
share
% Emigrant
share of
population
% High
skilled
emigrant share
Argentina 4.4% 4.3% 2.0% 65.5%
Australia 22.6% 71.1% 2.2% 80.6%
Austria 14.0% 66.3% 5.1% 76.5%
Belgium 13.7% 31.1% 4.1% 71.2%
Bulgaria 0.2% 89.0% 9.4% 57.8%
Brazil 0.3% 24.0% 0.5% 60.5%
Canada 19.9% 82.3% 3.7% 85.6%
Switzerland 23.8% 67.7% 7.5% 69.1%
Chile 1.2% 89.4% 2.9% 47.9%
Cyprus 13.0% 71.2% 12.0% 60.3%
Czech Republic 2.5% 76.6% 3.4% 73.8%
Germany 12.7% 60.1% 4.3% 75.4%
Denmark 8.2% 48.7% 3.4% 74.9%
Spain 11.0% 52.7% 2.1% 47.8%
Estonia 14.6% 80.4% 13.5% 76.8%
Finland 4.2% 48.9% 4.7% 69.6%
France 10.5% 52.5% 2.3% 69.6%
United Kingdom 11.7% 71.5% 6.3% 75.0%
Greece 10.9% 58.9% 6.3% 46.7%
Hungary 3.8% 75.5% 4.2% 77.6%
Indonesia 0.1% 15.1% 0.7% 16.5%
Ireland 14.8% 75.9% 15.8% 65.3%
Iceland 6.0% 62.0% 19.4% 80.6%
Israel 22.6% 76.4% 3.5% 83.1%
Italy 7.5% 52.3% 4.2% 43.4%
Lithuania 9.7% 50.4% 11.6% 67.9%
Luxembourg 37.6% 46.0% 9.0% 62.3%
Latvia 28.5% 47.1% 14.3% 76.2%
Mexico 0.4% 57.5% 8.7% 41.0%
Malta 4.0% 48.8% 17.1% 46.7%
Netherlands 9.8% 57.2% 4.5% 71.7%
Norway 10.5% 55.1% 3.0% 71.2%
New Zealand 25.8% 67.2% 14.6% 75.5%
Poland 0.7% 61.5% 7.9% 76.6%
Portugal 6.3% 50.4% 13.9% 34.4%
Romania 0.6% 36.7% 11.7% 66.6%
Russian Federation 10.3% 66.2% 3.1% 55.6%
Slovak Republic 2.5% 48.5% 5.9% 76.9%
Slovenia 10.7% 59.7% 6.2% 49.1%
Sweden 13.7% 65.5% 3.0% 77.3%
Turkey 2.7% 37.0% 3.6% 34.1%
United States 12.1% 67.1% 0.6% 62.6%
South Africa 6.2% 5.6% 1.3% 78.2%
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Table 3.2: Average Sales Summary Statistics
Value of Exports (thousands)
CAN DEU GBR MEX PRT USA
CAN - $3,676,691 $15,899,871 $4,865,217 $289,612 $289,418,959
DEU $8,528,851 - $78,355,783 $9,194,962 $10,343,578 $86,847,475
GBR $6,674,983 $44,119,716 - $1,411,185 $2,748,700 $57,846,613
MEX $10,663,920 $3,556,249 $1,732,810 - $183,112 $238,858,913
PRT $230,949 $6,239,533 $2,650,412 $533,405 - $1,737,085
USA $248,186,864 $48,040,817 $48,414,446 $163,320,693 $1,064,963 -
Number of Exporting Firms
CAN DEU GBR MEX PRT USA
CAN - 2,887 3,715 1,831 429 32,957
DEU 8,437 - 22,337 6,408 13,765 20,795
GBR 10,476 12,735 - 2,804 6,316 29,554
MEX 15,833 4,512 1,180 - 323 13,598
PRT 1,152 2,142 1,883 435 - 2,236
USA 94,443 34,731 42,188 51,466 3,559 -
Average Sales
CAN DEU GBR MEX PRT USA
CAN - $1,273,534 $4,279,911 $2,657,137 $675,085 $8,781,714
DEU $1,010,887 - $3,507,892 $1,434,919 $751,440 $4,176,363
GBR $637,169 $3,464,446 - $503,276 $435,196 $1,957,319
MEX $673,525 $788,176 $1,468,483 - $566,911 $17,565,739
PRT $200,477 $2,912,947 $1,407,548 $1,226,219 - $776,872
USA $2,627,901 $1,383,226 $1,147,588 $3,173,371 $299,231 -
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3.4.3 Estimating Migration Costs
I estimate equation (3.19) using pseudo maximum likelihood estimation techniques proposed
by Silva and Tenreyro (2006) to retrieve the determinants of international migration flows for
low and high skilled migrants. This method helps address the issue that comes from estimating
a log specification when there are occurrences of zero values in the dependent variable.
ln
(
Mi js
)
= αs0 + α
s
1ln
(
Di j
)
+ αs2Langi j + α
s
3S Bi j + α
s
4Colonyi j + S Dis + DD js + i js (3.19)
The estimates presented in Table (3.3) allow me to construct tˆi js, the costs of migration, for
individuals of skill s migrating from country i to country j. These costs along with equilibrium
wages and prices factor into the decision that individuals make on whether to migrate, and if so,
where. The results show migration between countries is decreasing in bilateral log distance but
increasing in the presence of language similarity, having a past colonial relationship and having
a shared border between countries. The results across skill types are generally similar, except
for the impact of sharing a colonial relationship which only matters for high skilled migration.
Language similarity and sharing a border exude more influence for low skilled migration but
both variables are also significant for high skilled migration. Using a similar structure, Grog-
ger and Hanson (2011) and Beine, Docquier and O¨zden (2011) also find that migration costs
as captured by bilateral distance, linguistic and cultural variables exert significant effects on
migration flows. My estimates are in line with theirs, for example, the effect of distance on
migration sits in the range they estimate of -0.139 to -0.613.
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Table 3.3: Barriers to Migration by Skill Level
Dependant Variable ln
(
mi jH
)
ln
(
mi jL
)
Distance ln
(
D ji
)
-0.218 -0.229
(0.095)** (0.114)**
Language Similarity Lang ji 1.392 1.879
(0.187)*** (0.310)***
Shared Border S B ji 1.247 1.743
(0.219)*** (0.286)***
Colonial Ties Colony ji 0.536 0.012
(0.190)*** (0.328)
R2 0.903 0.962
Observations 1806 1806
Notes: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
3.4.4 Estimating Trade Costs
The estimates of fˆ Ti j and fˆ
g
j j are fitted directly from the data using equations (3.18) and (3.16).
Using the fitted values of fˆ Ti j I estimate equation (3.20) via OLS to retrieve the components of
the variable cost in
(
τTi j
)−γ
that firms face when serving foreign markets.
The results in Table (3.4) show that my estimated elasticities of exports to the standard
gravity variables are consistent with the trade literature: export sales decrease with the distance
between two countries, whereas countries that share a common language, a land border, or
colonial ties have higher export sales between them. The results pertaining to migration show
that the estimated elasticity of exports to migrants are all in the range of 0.02-0.07, which
translates to a 10% increase in migrants being associated with a 0.2% to 0.7% increase in
bilateral trade. My results fall in the range of the estimated elasticities reported by Peri and
Requena-Silvente (2010) who find the majority of literature estimate elasticities between 0.01
and 0.40. My results show that the importance of the migrant effect depends strongly on the
skill of the migrants. The elasticity for skilled immigrants is three times as large as the one
estimated for unskilled immigrants, which is also estimated to be not significant. This result
will be important in the quantitative assessment of migration on welfare; countries with similar
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levels of emigrants will not benefit from the trade-creation effect to the same extent if there
exists large differences in the skill distribution of their emigrants.
ln
(
XTji
)
−
(
1 − γ
σT − 1
)
ln
(
fˆ Tji
)
= β1ln
(
D ji
)
+ β2Lang ji + β3S B ji + β4Colony ji + β5Landlock ji
+β6RT A ji + β7ln
(
Mi jH
)
+ β8ln
(
Mi jL
)
+β9ln
(
M jiH
)
+ β10ln
(
M jiL
)
+ λ j + λi +  ji (3.20)
Table 3.4: Barriers to Trade
Dependant Variable ln
(
XTji
)
−
(
1 − γ
σT−1
)
ln
(
fˆ Tji
)
Distance ln
(
D ji
)
-0.988
(0.046)***
Language Similarity Lang ji 0.361
(0.100)***
Shared Border S B ji 0.025
(0.119)
Colonial Ties Colony ji 0.227
(0.133)*
Landlocked Landlock ji 0.008
(0.194)
RTA RT A ji 0.382
(0.105)***
Skilled Immigrants ln
(
MHi j
)
0.061
(0.016)***
Unskilled Immigrants ln
(
MLi j
)
0.022
(0.016)
Skilled Emigrants ln
(
MHji
)
0.066
(0.016)***
Unskilled Emigrants ln
(
MLSji
)
0.032
(0.016)**
Adjusted R2 0.895
Observations 1806
Notes: *** p¡0.01, ** p¡0.05, * p¡0.1
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3.4.5 Labour Productivity and Parameter Values
To complete the numerical implementation of the model requires values of labour productivity,
A j, for every country in the model. I generate values of A j such that when I solve for the
model equilibrium,
{
Mi js
}J
j=1
∀ i , prices
{
PNj , P
T
j
}
J
j=1 , wages
{
w jH, w jL
}J
j=1
, and mass of firms{
eNj , e
T
j
}J
j=1
the PPP-adjusted GDP per capita for each country j in my model relative to the
U.S., matches the PPP-adjust per capita GDP relative to the U.S. using data from 2010.
w jL j(
PNj
)αN (PTj )αT (L jL+L jH)
wUS LUS
(PNUS )
αN (PTUS )
αT (LUS L+LUS H)
= R j/RUS ∀ j
where R j = GDP PPP Capita j in the data.
Lastly, I specify the parameter values found in the production function and effective labour
endowment. In the effective labour endowment L j, I must choose a value for η, the elasticity
of substitution between skilled and unskilled workers. Following Ottaviano and Peri (2012)
I set η = 3. The elasticity of substitution between varieties of goods, σg, is set to 6 for both
sectors, the middle of the range of estimates reported by Anderson and van Wincoop (2004)
and Feenstra (1994). The parameter governing the distribution of firm productivity, γ, is set
equal to 5.3 following Axtell (2001). For each country µN is set to 0.65 with µT = 0.35 which
reflects the share of non-tradeable and tradeable in consumption used by Alvarez and Lucas
(2007).
The variable and fixed cost values, τˆTji and fˆ
T
ji help determine overall trade volumes in
the model. Following Di Giovanni, Levchenko and Ortega (2015), to assess the model fit on
overall trade I compare the mean value of bilateral trade as a share of total income, pi ji =
XTji
w jL j
,
in the model to the data. The mean values are similar, in the data the value is 0.0055 and in
the model it is 0.0064; the gravity coefficients I use to generate bilateral trade in the model
fit the observed trade volumes quite well. Similarly, the migration cost values, tˆi js along with
equilibrium wages and price levels determine individual migration decisions. To assess the
model fit on overall migration I compare the mean value of emigration as a share of a country’s
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starting population, χi j =
∑
s
Mi js∑
s
Zis
, in the model to the data. The value in the data is 0.0016 and in
my model it is 0.0018; the determinants of migration cost I use to generate bilateral migration
in the model fit the observed migration levels quite well.
3.5 Quantitative Assessment
In this section I highlight the importance of the interaction between firm export decisions and
consumer migration decisions. Consumers can benefit from trade by importing foreign vari-
eties. However, consumers always benefit more from increases in domestic product variety
compared to foreign product varieties because of trade costs. The benefits of foreign varieties
decrease with trade barriers and in the extreme case where trade costs are infinitely large there
is no benefit to increases in foreign variety. In the second half of this section I compare real
income in a no-migration counterfactual to the level of real income from the currently observed
levels of migration to assess the impact of migration and measure the relative importance of
the trade-creation effects in contributing to the overall welfare impact.
3.5.1 The Responsiveness of Migration to Changes in Trade Costs
To see the responsiveness of migration to changes in trade costs I resolve the baseline model
with an exogenous decrease in trade costs of 20% for all country pairs. Figure (3.1) shows this
policy has a positive effect on the average real wages of native-born stayers in countries that
exhibit population growth after a reduction in trade costs. In all my experiments the average
real wages of native-born stayers in a country j, are calculated as,
M j jH
w jH(
PNj
)αN (PTj )αT + M j jL
w jL(
PNj
)αN (PTj )αT
M j jH + M j jL
The relationship between population and real wage is roughly monotonic: in countries where
the population fell (rose), real wages decreases (increases). Figure (3.2) shows the effects of
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the drop in trade costs to changes in the emigration rate and the tradeable price sector, relative
to the baseline model. As shown by the dashed line, representing the line of best fit, there is
a positive relationship between the emigration rate in a country and PT , the price level in the
tradeable sector. The increase in real wages coming from increased imports and a lower PT
leads to, on average, a lower emigration rate in a country. A few countries see a small increase
in their tradeable price sector, this is caused by the labour market and market size effects of
having a smaller population from less immigration. Consumers benefit from both new firms
finding it profitable to export for the first time and existing exporters increasing their sales to
their location. Figure (3.3) shows the effects of a drop in trade costs on the emigration rate
and shows that there is a strong negative relationship between the emigration rate in a country
and changes in average real wages of native-born stayers. As we would expect, the better off
a country is after a reduction in trade costs, the less incentive one has to emigrate. The small
losses that many countries exhibit is caused by the drop in immigration to these countries from
countries located in the 4th quadrant of the figure.
In my second counterfactual scenario I document the response of consumers and firms to
a regional trade cost reduction. Migration rates should be lower in regions with low trade
barriers; there is less need to migrate to a neighboring country when I can import a variety
of products from that neighboring country, thereby decreasing the price level I face in my
domestic country and increasing my real income. For example, if after joining NAFTA, Mexico
saw increases to their real wages, Mexicans would have less incentive to migrate to the United
States. However, the extent to which having easier access to goods from Mexico increases real
wages in the United States will incentivise migration to the United States from Mexico. My
model is flexible enough to study the quantitative importance of this mechanism because I can
observe changes to migration after lowering trade costs and quantitatively study which effect
is stronger in equilibrium. Figure (3.4) shows the effects of reducing both the variable and
fixed trade costs in 10% increments on the tradeable price level in each country and the level
of Mexican immigration to the United States. As the trade costs between the two countries
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decrease the price level in both countries decreases; imports become cheaper and consumers
benefit. Changes in Mexican immigration to the United States only become notable once trade
costs are reduced by more than 40%. At that point the benefits of working in the United States
and earning a higher nominal wage decreases in importance because Mexican stayers can now
enjoy the benefits of importing USA produced goods at a lower cost and do not have to incur
the migration cost to consume them in the United States. These results are large compared
to what has been estimated by Caliendo and Parro (2015) but are qualitatively similar in that
Mexico gains the most from a reduction in trade costs. Quantitative differences result, in part,
from the migration response in my model that serves to amplify the gains in Mexico.
In contrast to my second counterfactual scenario, and more inline with present day policy14,
I use the model to study the effects on firm decisions and consumer migration decisions follow-
ing an increase in trade costs between Canada and the United States. I simulate the effects of
increasing both the variable and fixed trade costs in 10% increments on the tradeable price level
in each country and level of migration to the United States from Canada. Figure (3.5) shows
the results of these increments. Following the increase in trade costs, Canadian imports from
the United States fall and the price level in the Canadian tradeable sector increases. Canada’s
dependence on the U.S. as a tradeable partner is reflected in this increase. In contrast, the U.S.
tradeable price sector changes are marginal compared to Canada’s; in relative terms, Canada
is a much smaller trading partner for the U.S. We also see a modest decrease in migration to
the United States from Canada, however the net-population in Canada stays relatively stable
as consumers increase their migration rates to other countries. U.S. emigration rates increase
slightly following this trade increase, this increase coupled with the trade-creation effect of
migrants helps to marginally lower the price level in the U.S.
14See appendix for a brief background on the tariff measures enacted by the United States and the tariff coun-
termeasures enacted by Canada in response
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Figure 3.1: Changes in Welfare and Population Following a Reduction in Trade-Costs
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Figure 3.2: Tradeable price level and the emigration rate Following a Reduction in Trade-Costs
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Figure 3.3: Real wages and the emigration rate Following a Reduction in Trade-Costs
62 Chapter 3. The Trade-Creation Effect of Migrants
Figure 3.4: United States and Mexico Trade Cost Reduction
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Figure 3.5: United States and Canada Trade Cost Increase
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3.5.2 No-Migration Counterfactual
My main counterfactual experiment involves evaluating the welfare effects of sending all foreign-
born individuals back to their country of origin. The source of the welfare changes can be traced
to changes in labour market conditions - responses in wages, and to changes in firm production
decisions - responses in firm export behaviour. The welfare comparison measure used in the
analysis is the real wages of native-born stayers.
Table (3.5) shows the changes in population ordered by magnitude of population change
from the counterfactual experiment. For example, Australia and Canada have a decrease in
population of over 15%, whereas Malta and Iceland have their population rise by over 15%,
when all foreign-born individuals return to their country of origin.
Table (3.6) shows my main results, the percentage change in average real wages for native
stayers between the no migration scenario relative to the observed levels of migration generated
by the benchmark model. The results show that for some countries the main channel by which
migration affects welfare is by changes in labour market conditions. The first column of Table
(3.6) shows the overall change in average welfare. Countries with large immigrant populations
benefit the most; average welfare in Canada and the United States is 6% and 4.5% higher in a
world with migration relative to the counterfactual experiment. Countries that have had a net
loss in population due to high emigration are worse off; in Portugal and Poland average welfare
is 1.25% and 2.5% lower in a world with migration.
The results in the second column are generated by running the experiment while not allow-
ing for immigrants and emigrants to influence the trade costs that firms face. In this counter-
factual the only channels by which migration affects welfare is via changes in labour market
and market size effects. The results suggest that there exists heterogeneity in the importance of
the firm export behaviour across countries.
For Canada and the United States there is little change in welfare. For these countries
the marginal firm that no longer finds it profitable to begin domestic production because of a
reduction in international profits is on average quite small and does not have much of an impact
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on average welfare. Furthermore, the welfare contribution of importing additional varieties at
a lower cost is small compared to the labour market and market size welfare gains resulting
from the large increase in population from immigration. Whereas for countries like Portugal
and Poland, the inability of foreign firms to access these markets at a lower cost has a much
larger impact. This suggests that in these countries the marginal firm that no longer finds it
profitable to export is on average large, relative to the firms ceasing production in Canada and
the United States. For Cyprus and Ireland the affects are strong enough that the benefits of
international migration go from positively affecting average welfare to negatively affecting it.
For these countries the trade-creation effect mitigates some of the loss in welfare stemming
from the labour market and market size effects of emigration lowering their overall population.
I also decompose the overall change in welfare for the two skill groups by country. Figure
(3.6) shows that for all countries at least one skill group has gained from migration. For ex-
ample, in Mexico, low skilled workers have suffered losses to their average welfare but high
skilled Mexicans are better off. This may come as a surprise given the large levels of low
skilled Mexican emigration to the U.S., one would surmise that the low skilled labour remain-
ing in Mexico would be better off. However, the emigration rate for high school graduates and
college educated Mexicans is actually higher than those of low skilled high school dropouts15
(Aydemir and Borjas, 2007). In Canada both high and low-skilled workers have benefited from
migration, however, due to Canada’s immigration policy that target high-skilled immigrants,
low-skilled native-born Canadians have had much larger gains in real income.
15In absolute terms the number of low-skill workers emigrating from Mexico is higher than that of high-skilled
workers.
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Table 3.5: No Migration Counterfactual: Impact on Population
Country Change in Population Country Change in Population
Luxembourg -31.46% Italy -3.44%
Australia -20.84% Argentina -2.39%
Israel -19.79% Estonia -1.34%
Switzerland -17.67% Cyprus -1.19%
Canada -16.80% Brazil 0.19%
Latvia -16.60% Hungary 0.52%
New Zealand -13.13% Finland 0.57%
United States -11.53% Indonesia 0.57%
Sweden -11.10% Czech Republic 0.90%
Belgium -10.09% Turkey 0.91%
Austria -9.45% Ireland 1.27%
Spain -9.09% Chile 1.76%
Germany -8.74% Lithuania 2.16%
France -8.34% Slovak Republic 3.63%
Norway -7.70% Poland 7.83%
Russian Federation -7.42% Portugal 8.89%
United Kingdom -5.69% Mexico 9.11%
Netherlands -5.50% Bulgaria 10.09%
Denmark -4.99% Romania 12.55%
Greece -4.96% Malta 15.72%
South Africa -4.91% Iceland 16.59%
Slovenia -4.84%
Notes: Change in population using 2010 data
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Table 3.6: Model Predictions on Welfare Changes
Country
Overall
Change
No Trade-
Creation
Effect
Country
Overall
Change
No Trade-
Creation
Effect
Argentina 0.40% 0.41% Iceland -4.48% -5.08%
Australia 8.11% 8.51% Israel 8.73% 5.31%
Austria 4.77% 3.05% Italy 3.34% 2.04%
Belgium 3.30% 0.59% Lithuania -0.02% -1.63%
Bulgaria -2.35% -3.76% Luxembourg 11.61% 7.83%
Brazil 0.57% 0.81% Latvia 4.84% 3.33%
Canada 5.94% 6.40% Mexico -2.46% -2.72%
Switzerland 7.84% 5.34% Malta -2.64% -9.04%
Chile 0.45% -0.04% Netherlands 2.87% 0.23%
Cyprus 2.50% -0.80% Norway 2.97% 2.31%
Czech Republic 0.43% -1.38% New Zealand 4.79% 3.82%
Germany 4.05% 2.81% Poland -2.44% -3.54%
Denmark 2.59% 0.31% Portugal -1.24% -3.00%
Spain 3.97% 3.05% Romania -5.16% -6.24%
Estonia 1.64% 0.10% Russia 2.47% 2.93%
Finland 0.37% -0.26% Slovak Republic -1.35% -3.16%
France 3.31% 2.53% Slovenia 3.58% 1.09%
United Kingdom 3.14% 1.64% Sweden 4.65% 4.01%
Greece 3.83% 2.26% Turkey 0.71% 0.03%
Hungary 1.09% -0.58% United States 4.54% 4.31%
Indonesia 0.69% 0.32% South Africa 1.14% 0.75%
Ireland 1.52% -0.22%
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Figure 3.6: Model Predictions on Welfare Changes by Skill Level
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3.6 Conclusion
In this chapter I developed a model that is able to assess the impact that global migration has
had on country level welfare. I find that the impact from the observed levels of migration has
had a positive welfare impact for the majority of countries in my sample, even some that have
had net losses in population from migration such as Ireland and Chile. My main finding is that
the importance of the transmission channels by which migration affects native-born stayers’
welfare in a country varies. For countries such as Canada and the United States the main
impact from international migration is from labour market and market size effects whereas for
countries such as Portugal and Poland the trade-creation channel is equally important. For net-
emigration countries like Portugal and Poland, the trade-creation effect mitigates some of the
loss in welfare stemming from the labour market and market size effects. Furthermore, because
I endogenize the consumer migration decision I can observe the welfare effects of a trade-
reduction policy that accounts for the interaction between firm export decisions and individual
migration decisions. The migration response of consumers following a trade-reduction policy
can make some countries worse off. The more gains to real income a previously high emigrant
country accrues from a reduction in trade costs, the less incentive consumers in that country
have to emigrate. In the context of an experiment where trade costs between the United States
and Mexico decrease I find Mexican immigration to the United States falls and real income in
Mexico increases from the increased trade between the two countries. Overall, countries that
see decreases to their population following a trade-reduction policy are worse off.
Ignored in my study are the effects of remittance inflows on the real income of consumers.
Similar to the trade-creation effect, remittances should help to partially offset the negative
impact on real wages from the market size effect in net-emigration countries. For countries
such as the Philippines, a country with 4 million emigrants and remittance inflows equivalent
to 15% of GDP this effect can be considerable.
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Chapter 4
Immigrants and Exports: Firm-level
evidence from Canada
4.1 Introduction
In contemporary models of trade the ability of a firm to export is largely driven by exogenous
differences in firm productivity; the more productive firms will export and the less produc-
tive firms will only sell domestically or exit the market entirely (Melitz, 2003). However, on
its own, differences in productivity are not enough to explain a firm’s decision to export to
new markets (Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz, 2011). Firms must exhibit other differences that
vary their ability to overcome the frictions of international trade and participate in what would
otherwise be advantageous trading opportunities.
An important friction that firms face is information based: information about trading oppor-
tunities (Allen, 2014), trading terms (Steinwender, 2018), or a lack of assurance that trading
terms will be honored (Head and Mayer, 2013). Members of migrant networks can play a
key role in overcoming these information barriers by acting as intermediaries between firms
and inducing trade (Rauch, 1999, 2001; Rauch and Trindade, 2002). In this paper, we use a
matched Canadian employer-employee dataset to analyze how firms’ immigrant employment
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affects exporting behavior to the home countries of their immigrant workforce.
Our main contributions in this paper are to: i) add to the limited firm level evidence on the
pro-trade effect of immigrant employment at firms using matched employee-employer Cana-
dian data; ii) adapt index number methods from the Industrial Organization production function
estimation literature to deal with the endogeneity concern present in these types of studies (Do-
raszelski and Jaumandreu, 2013; Gandhi, Navarro and Rivers, 2018); and iii) provide causal
estimates of the immigrant trade-creation effect that overcomes both the unit of observation
and endogeneity bias concerns of earlier studies.
To estimate the pro-trade relationship of immigration on firm export sales we specify a
model where firms make labor input choices from different source countries. From this problem
we derive an equation where we can infer the effects of immigrants on firm trade costs from
observed employment and both domestic and foreign sales. Prior attempts at evaluating the
causal effect of a firm’s migrant worker composition on firm exports using firm level data have
relied solely on instrumental variables (IV) techniques. However, the lack of a convincing
natural experiment to supplement the use of an IV strategy results in instruments that are likely
correlated with a firm’s immigrant source-country composition and exports. Our estimation
results do not suffer from these issues and enable us to estimate the causal pro-trade effect
of immigrant employment on firm export behaviour. We find that an increase in immigrant
employment from a particular source country is associated with an increase in the probability
of exporting to that destination and an increase in export sales to that destination.
Gould (1994) and Head and Ries (1999) provided the first empirical evidence showing
immigrants have a positive effect on bilateral trade flows. Subsequent research showed that
these results are robust to different specifications, countries and time periods (e.g. Dunlevy
(2006); Peri and Requena-Silvente (2010)). These studies typically find that a 10 per cent
increase in immigrants from a particular source country is associated with a one to three percent
increase in exports to that immigrants source country.
The mechanism by which these researchers frame the immigrant pro-trade effect occurs
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at the firm level: firms with access to immigrant workers with the foreign expertise of an in-
tended export destination can increase exports to a destination, or export to a destination that
they would otherwise not have found profitable. However, the unit of observation used in these
studies is aggregate country level exports. Another limitation in these earlier papers is inter-
preting their pro-trade immigrant results as a causal effect. Two major concerns are i) spurious
correlation due to unobserved favorable conditions between two countries, simultaneously pro-
moting both trade and migration, and ii) reversal causality due to the possibility of immigrants
settling in countries with strong trade-links to their home country because of their preference
for home goods. Recent work has tried to address these two concerns.
Papers by Hiller (2013) and Hatzigeorgiou and Lodefalk (2016) overcome the data limita-
tion of earlier studies and find that firms benefit from immigrant employment by facing lower
trade costs of exporting to the home country of their immigrant workers. The lower trade costs
that these firms face leads to an increase in export sales to existing markets and an expansion
to new markets. These authors recognize that unobserved factors can confound simple OLS
estimates and attempt to identify the causal impact of immigration on firm exports using IV
strategies. To instrument for immigrant employment at firm i, Hiller (2013) uses the number
of migrants born in country k employed at all other firms. However, if two firms are linked via
the supply chain (e.g. intermediate input suppliers), the decision of one firm to hire immigrants
from country k to facilitate exporting to country k is potentially correlated with the other firm’s
immigrant hiring decisions and export flows. Hiller (2013) and Hatzigeorgiou and Lodefalk
(2016) also use lagged immigrant employment as an instrument for current employment at a
firm. While past immigrant employment is likely to be correlated with current immigrant em-
ployment, as noted by these authors, this instrument likely violates the exclusion restriction
because firms make trade decisions many years in advance.
In regards to the causality concerns, Cohen, Gurun and Malloy (2017) and Parsons and
Vzina (2018) use plausible exogenous immigrant settlements in the United States of Japanese
disbursement to internment camps during the 1940s and Vietnamese refugees arriving during
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the 1970s to explore the pro-trade immigrant effect. They confirm the previous results and find
an elasticity of trade to immigrants in the range of 0.1-0.3 using aggregate export sales as their
unit of observation.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section (4.2) we describe the data sources
and document several stylized facts regarding the relationship between immigrant employment
and firm-exporting. In addition to the minimum necessary information such as firm export sales
by destination, and firm source country worker composition we have additional information on
immigrant workers from their Canadian landing record files. With this data we study potential
mechanisms by which immigrants reduce the information frictions that exist in bilateral trade.
For example, by comparing the pro-trade effect of foreign-born workers that only speak the
destination language, versus those that speak the destination language and originate from that
country as well we find that the language spoken of immigrants has a significant impact on
increasing firm exports.
Motivated by these findings, in Section (4.3), we analyze the relationship between immi-
grant employment and firm exporting through the lens of a model in which firms have idiosyn-
cratic productivity and destination-specific demand, and face destination-specific fixed and
variable costs to export. These costs depend on the number of immigrants the firm hires from
each destination. We derive equations for firm-level export entry and sales by destination as
functions of observable firm and destination characteristics and the unobservable destination-
specific demand. Recognizing the probable bias in the pro-trade estimates of this model we
extend the basic model to deal with the endogeneity concerns by specifying the firm’s problem
in terms of labor input choices from different source countries. The estimating equation we de-
rive from this problem enables us to estimate the causal pro-trade immigrant effect. As noted
above, prior attempts at evaluating the causal effect of a firm’s migrant worker composition on
firm exports have relied solely on IV techniques.
The estimation results in Section (4.4) show that there exists a strong, robust pro-trade
effect for firms that employ immigrant workers. We find that i) both the extensive and intensive
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margin of export sales are positively affected; ii) this effect is strongest for export sales in the
differentiated goods market. Finally we conclude and provide discussion on future research in
this topic in Section (4.5).
4.2 Data
We use the Canadian Employer-Employee Dynamics Database-Trade by Enterprise Charac-
teristics, a unique longitudinal dataset with linkages of multiple individual and firm files from
several federal Canadian departments.
4.2.1 Data Sources
We draw on four major Canadian administration data sources for our estimation. From the
National Accounts Longitudinal Microdata File (NALMF) we have information for all incor-
porated firms operating in Canada between the years 2005-2013. This longitudinal administra-
tive database is complied from data in the Business Register (BR), employer payroll deduction
remittance forms (PD7), corporate income tax accounts (T2), and business income on personal
tax forms (T1). This data includes, but is not limited to, information on a firm’s employee
payroll, profits, number of employees, and four-digit NAICS industry code.16
We link export information to each firm in the NALMF from data in the Trade by Exporter
Characteristics (TEC). The TEC files contain annual firm-level information on the value of
export sales by country, decomposed at the six-digit Harmonized Sales goods classification
level. We have four years of export data beginning in 2010. The level of detail in export sales
allows us to decompose the value of exports into differentiated products and homogeneous
products using the Rauch (1999) classification and test the assertion that the immigrant pro-
trade effect is stronger for the sales of differentiated products compared to homogeneous ones.
At the individual level, we have comprehensive information for every Canadian tax-filer
16See appendix for a full list of variables and their sources.
78 Chapter 4. Immigrants and Exports: Firm-level evidence from Canada
(native and immigrant) on items as diverse as employment income, industry of employment,
and geographical location sourced from personal income tax forms that collectively is referred
to as the Canadian Employer-Employee Dynamics Database (CEEDD).
For an immigrant tax-filer, there is additional information sourced from the Longitudinal
Immigration Database (IMDB), which includes the landing records of all persons that obtained
permanent resident status in Canada since 1980 and filed at least one tax return since 1982.
From the IMDB we have information on immigrant workers that includes, but is not limited to,
their country of birth, last country of residence, primary language spoken, and Canadian official
language ability. Table (4.1) shows the top 15 source countries for immigrant employment
during the 2010-2013 time period. India, the Philippines and China make up the top three
source countries for employment in the manufacturing industry. These countries also top the
list of countries of birth for recent immigrants.17
4.2.2 Sample of Interest
We restrict our analysis to an unbalanced panel of manufacturing firms that operated between
2010 to 2013 and link employee data to these firms going back to 2007. The data contains
52,421 unique firms of which 18,151 have positive export sales to at least one country during
the four year period. Exporting firms are on average larger than non-exporting firms; average
employment in exporting firms is 104 workers whereas for non-exporting firms it is only 14.
This employment disparity also exists for immigrant employment; on average exporting firms
employ 24 foreign-born workers whereas non-exporting firms only employ 3. The most likely
export destination for a Canadian manufacturing firm is, unsurprisingly, the Untied States, over
30% of exporting firms 18 exported to the US.
17Statistics Canada, Immigrant population in Canada, 2016 Census of Population
18We refer to exporting firms as firms that exported to at least one country during the four year period
4.2. Data 79
Table 4.1: Immigrant Source Countries
Country Immigrants Employed
India 194,328
Philippines 174,688
China 135,669
Vietnam 105,657
Sri Lanka 52,330
Poland 51,396
Romania 34,714
Guyana 34,359
Hong Kong 33,280
United Kingdom 32,684
Pakistan 26,648
Jamaica 26,181
El Salvador 22,037
Russia 19,352
Haiti 19,219
Notes: Employment numbers for manufacturing
firms using the sample pooled from 2010-2013
4.2.3 Trends in immigrant employment and firm export behavior
Using this data we document several new data facts on the relationship between immigrant
employment and Canadian manufacturing firms’ exporting behaviour. From Figure (4.1) we
see that conditional on employing an immigrant from a particular country a firm is more likely
to export there. For example, the fraction of manufacturing firms that export to Denmark is only
0.009 but if we only look at firms that have Danish employees the fraction increases to 0.182.
Figure (4.2) shows that firm export sales relative to domestic sales increases substantially to
country k for firms with immigrant employment from country k. For example, overall average
relative export sales to China are only 1.3% for Canadian manufacturing firms but if we focus
in on firms that have Chinese employees the average increases to 3.8%. From Table (4.2) we
see that the pro-trade immigration effect holds across the firm-size distribution. This suggests
that it is neither just small, privately owned immigrant enterprises exporting to their origin
country, nor only large multinational firms trading between its international subsidiaries that
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is driving the pro-trade immigration effect. Taken together, these findings suggest that the
source-country composition of workers at a firm is important in explaining the differences in
firm export behaviour. In Section (4.3) we outline the theoretical framework that relates the the
source composition of workers at a firm to a firm’s decision to sell to a country, and conditional
on entering, how much to sell.
Figure 4.1: Firm Exporting and Immigrant Composition
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Figure 4.2: Relative Export Sales and Immigrant Composition
Table 4.2: Firm Exports by Revenue Quartile
With Immigrant Employment Without Immigrant Employment
Revenue Quartile Positive Exports Flows Positive Exports Flows
1 0.57% 0.04%
2 1.01% 0.14%
3 2.26% 0.38%
4 8.61% 1.45%
Notes: An observation is a firm-country pair pooled over the time period 2010-2013. The with
immigrant employment column shows the percentage of exporting firms that export to country k
conditional on having immigrant employment from country k.
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4.3 Theoretical framework
Firms are indexed by i and countries are indexed by j, k = 1, . . . ,K. We label Canada as country
1. Firms decide on whether to sell to each country, and conditional on entering, how much to
sell. A firm has to pay a fixed cost fk (Nik) to sell to country k and there is an iceberg cost
τk (Nik) per unit of goods shipped. Nik is the number of immigrants from country k employed
at firm i. We assume that the fixed and iceberg exporting costs take the forms:
τk(Nik) = exp(β′τDk) × gτ(Nik) (4.1)
fk(Nik) = exp(β′f Dk) × g f (Nik) (4.2)
where β′τDk and β
′
f Dk are linear combinations of a set of country k’s characteristics, Dk, that
proxy for how distance from Canada affects each cost function, as in the gravity literature, and
the functions gτ and g f are common across countries.
There is a representative consumer in each country with preferences given by the CES
aggregator,
Qk =
(∫
Ωk
α
1
σ
ikq
σ−1
σ
ik di
) σ
σ−1
where the elasticity of substitution is σ > 1. αik is a firm- and country-specific demand shock
that is lognormally distributed i.i.d. across firms and countries. Let total income in country k
be Yk.
Demand for good i in country k is given by
qik = αikQk
(
pik
Pk
)−σ
Or in terms of expenditures,
xik = pikqik = p1−σik αikEk
where the price index Pk is given by Pk =
(∫
Ωk
p1−σik αikdi
)1/(1−σ)
and Ek = YkP1−σk
.
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4.3.1 Export sales and export entry
For now we assume that a firm cannot choose its composition of workers. Firm i’s productivity
is φi, and the wage is w. Firm i has to produce τk (Nik) units to sell one unit to country k, so the
per-unit cost of selling to k is wτk(Nik)
φi
. If firm i sells to country k, the variable profits from doing
so are given by: (
pik − wτk (Nik)
φi
)
qik
Plugging in country k’s demand and maximizing leads firm i to set its price as a constant
markup over its marginal cost,
pik =
σ
σ − 1
wτk (Nik)
φi
So firm i’s export sales are given by
xik =
(
σ
σ − 1
wτk (Nik)
φi
)1−σ
αikEk
We can substitute out for σ
σ−1
w
φi
using the analogous expression for domestic sales. Letting
Canada be denoted country 1, firm i’s domestic sales are xi1 =
(
σ
σ−1
w
φi
)1−σ
αi1E1, so
xik = xi1τk (Nik)1−σ
αik
αi1
Ek
E1
Taking logs and using the form of τk in equation (4.1),
log xik = log xi1 + (1 − σ)β′τDk + (1 − σ) log gτ(Nik) + log α˜ik + log E˜k (4.3)
where α˜ik = log
(
αik
αi1
)
and E˜k = log
(
Ek
E1
)
.
Equation (4.3) forms the basis of our first method for estimating the effect of immigrant
employment on export sales conditional on exporting.
Next, we derive an equation to estimate the effect of immigrant employment on the ex-
tensive margin of export sales. Firm i’s decision of whether to export is characterized by an
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inequality: profits from exporting to k are a constant fraction of sales, piik = xik/σ, and export-
ing requires paying a fixed cost fk(Nik). We use the indicator Ξik = 1 if firm i exports to country
k, which is the case if xik ≥ σ fk(Nik). Substituting for domestic sales again,
Ξik =

1 if xi1τk(Nik)1−σα˜ikE˜k ≥ σ fk (Nik)
0 otherwise
(4.4)
We can transform equation (4.4) into a probabilistic statement:
Pr(Ξik = 1) = Pr
(
αik
αi1
≥ E1
Ek
1
xi1τk(Nik)1−σ
σ fk(Nik)
)
= Pr
(
log α˜ik ≤ log E˜k + log xi1 + (1 − σ) log τk(Nik) − log(σ fk(Nik))
)
(4.5)
where the second line uses the symmetry of the normal distribution of log α˜ik to invert the
inequality. Equation (4.5) forms the basis for estimating the effect of immigrant employment
on export entry into a market.
If the firm observes part of αik before making decisions, then all these methods have en-
dogeneity problems: if the firm knows that hiring more immigrants from k lowers the cost of
selling there, then Nik is positively correlated with αik, and OLS estimates of the sales equation
and linear probability model estimates of the export entry equation will be biased upwards.
One option to deal with the endogeneity of Nik is to instrument with lags of Nik, because
presumably, past immigrant employment is correlated with current immigrant employment, but
uncorrelated (or less correlated) with current (transitory) shocks to demand.
Another option for an instrument is something other papers have used: the number of
migrants from k minus the migrants employed by firm i—denoted say, by N−ik. The logic is
that the prevalence of migrants from k available for hiring increases the likelihood that firm i
will hire a migrant from k independent of its propensity to export to k. A refinement of this
method is to consider migrants from k employed by all other firms in i’s industry only.
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4.3.2 Export sales and export entry with multiple sectors
We can easily extend the theoretical framework in the previous section to also account for how
the effect of immigrant employment on export sales can adjust to exports of different classes
of goods. We adjust our model such that consumers now have preferences over homogeneous
and differentiated goods and the fixed and iceberg exporting costs are also sector specific.
To distinguish between different classes of goods we follow the Rauch (1999) goods classi-
fication and split our data on firm export sales into either homogeneous or differentiated export
sales. The belief is that the higher costs associated with trade in the differentiated goods sector
should lead to a stronger pro-trade immigrant impact in that sector. For example, lower infor-
mation costs arise in the homogeneous products sector due to the availability of a standardized
reference price, quoted on organized exchanges, for prospective buyers and sellers. Following
similar steps that we outlined previously in Section (4.3) firm i’s export sales of homogeneous
and differentiated export sales are given by,
xHik =x
H
i1τ
H
k (Nik)
1−σH α
H
ik
αHi1
EHk
EH1
(4.6)
xDik =x
D
i1τ
D
k (Nik)
1−σD α
D
ik
αDi1
EDk
E1
(4.7)
Taking logs of equations (4.6) and equation (4.7) and using the same form of the iceberg ex-
porting costs we outlined in equation (4.1) we can study the effects of immigrant employment
on homogeneous and differentiated export sales conditional on exporting.
log xHik = log x
H
i1 + (1 − σH)β′τDHk + (1 − σH) log gHτ (Nik) + log α˜Hik + log E˜Hk (4.8)
log xDik = log x
D
i1 + (1 − σD)β′τDDk + (1 − σD) log gDτ (Nik) + log α˜Dik + log E˜Dk (4.9)
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4.3.3 Firms’ hiring decisions
An alternative method for dealing with the endogeneity concerns is by specifying the firm’s
problem of choosing Nik and using the first order conditions of this problem to derive an equa-
tion that we estimate.
To write the firm’s problem in terms of labor input choices, we start from output: for each
destination k to which firm i sells, to satisfy demand it must produce qik = τk (Nik) p−σik αikEk,
which can be inverted to: (
qik
τk (Nik)
)−1/σ
(αikEk)1/σ = pik
So revenues for firm i from selling to k are:
rik = pik
qik
τk (Nik)
=
(
qik
τk (Nik)
)σ−1
σ
(αikEk)
1
σ
To write the profit maximization problem in terms of labor inputs {Nik}k=1,...,K , first take as
given firm i’s total output yi, and solve for the quantities exported to each country k, qik. Firm i
allocates its sales to maximize revenues, taking as given the αik’s:
max
{qik}
∑
k
Ξikq
σ−1
σ
ik (τk (Nik))
1−σ
σ (αikEk)
1
σ
s.t.
∑
k
Ξikqik ≤ yi
The first order conditions for output produced for sale to k, qik, and output produced for do-
mestic sale, qi1, conditional on Ξik = 1, yield:
qi1
αikEk
αi1E1
τk (Nik)1−σ = qik (4.10)
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Summing equation (4.10) across k and rearranging gives:
qid
αidEd
=
yi∑
k ΞikαikEkτk (Nik)
1−σ (4.11)
Using (4.10) and (4.11), we can write total revenues as:
∑
k
Ξikq
σ−1
σ
ik (τk (Nik))
1−σ
σ (αikEk)
1
σ = y
σ−1
σ
i
∑
k
ΞikαikEkτk (Nik)1−σ

1
σ
(4.12)
Firm i’s production technology is yi = φi
∑
k Nik, so with total revenues given by (4.12), the
profit maximization problem is:
max
{Nik}k
φi ∑
k
Nik

σ−1
σ
∑
k
ΞikαikEkτk (Nik)1−σ

1
σ
− w
∑
k
Ni j −
∑
k
Ξik fk (Nik)
Conditional on Ξik = 1, the first-order condition for Nik is:
0 =
σ − 1
σ
φi ∑
j
Ni j

σ−1
σ −1
φi
∑
j
Ξi jαi jE jτ j
(
Ni j
)1−σ
1
σ
+
φi ∑
j
Ni j

σ−1
σ 1
σ
∑
j
Ξi jαi jE jτ j
(
Ni j
)1−σ
1
σ−1
αikEk (1 − σ) τk (Nik)−σ ∂τk (Nik)
∂Nik
− ∂ fk (Nik)
∂Nik
− w
Using the fact that revenue shares are given by
rik
ri
=
rik∑
j Ξi jri j
=
τk (Nik)1−σ αikEk∑
j Ξi jτ j
(
Ni j
)1−σ
αi jE j
we can simplify the first order condition to:
wNik =
σ − 1
σ
ri
Nik∑
j Ni j
+ rik
1 − σ
σ
∂ log τk (Nik)
∂ log Nik
− ∂ fk (Nik)
∂Nik
Nik (4.13)
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Equation (4.13) shows how we can infer the effects of immigrants on trade costs from ob-
served employment and sales. In the absence of effects of immigrants on τ and f , (i.e. if
∂ log τk(Nik)
∂ log Nik
= 0 and ∂ fk(Nik)
∂Nik
= 0), equation (4.13) states that payments to workers from country k
as a fraction of firm i’s revenues would equal the product of labor compensation’s total share of
revenues, σ−1
σ
, times the fraction of employees from country k, Nik∑
j Ni j
. So, the wage payments
firm i makes to immigrants from country k above this amount is compensation for the marginal
increase in revenues associated with reduced trade costs for exporting to country k. This ad-
ditional compensation comes in the form of two components, corresponding to the reductions
in variable and fixed trade costs. The first part of this reduction, ∂ log τk(Nik)
∂ log Nik
, raises payments
to migrants from k proportional to firm i’s sales to country k, rik, since each additional unit
of sales benefits from the variable trade cost reduction. The second term, which is just the
marginal reduction in the fixed costs of selling to k, scaled by the number of workers from k,
Nik, corresponds to the increased profit firm i receives, independent of how much firm i sells to
country k.
4.4 Empirical Findings
In this section, we report estimates of the firm-level effects of immigrant employment on ex-
porting where the functional form of the functions gτ(Nik) and g f (Nik) in τk(Nik) = exp(β′τDk)×
gτ(Nik) and fk(Nik) = exp(β′f Dk) × g f (Nik) take the form of,
(1) gτ(Nik) = (1 + Nik)ετ
(2) g f (Nik) = (1 + Nik)ε f
With this functional form all firms for which immigrant employment from country k equals
zero, Nik = 0, the variable and fixed costs of exporting to country k will be identical and
only depend on the linear combinations of a set of country k′s characteristics Dk. We take
the standard proxies for distance from the gravity literature for Dk: geodesic distance between
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countries, and dummy variables that specify whether country k is landlocked, shares a Free
Trade Agreement (FTA) with Canada, or has English as their official language.
From our OLS estimates of equation (4.3) in Table (4.3) we can see there is a significant
role for immigrant employment to increase export sales to their source country. Conditional on
a firm having positive export flows to country k, a 10% increase in immigrant employment at
a firm from country k is correlated with 2.7% higher export sales. This result is similar to the
results found by Hatzigeorgiou and Lodefalk (2016): an increase in 1.219 immigrant workers
at a firm from country k is correlated with a 4.4% higher export sales to country k. We also
find that the language spoken of immigrant employees is linked to increased export sales for
a firm; a 10% increase in immigrants that only speak the language of the destination country
k is correlated with 0.5% higher export sales to k. These results provide new evidence on the
mechanisms by which immigrants promote trade; immigrants reduce the language frictions
that make up a segment of the information frictions that exist in international trade. The coef-
ficients on our other variables are as expected. We find a positive relationship between a firm’s
domestic sales20 and export sales; a 10% increase in domestic sales increases firm exports to
all destinations by 3.3%. Similarly, destination GDP, destination GDP per capita, and indica-
tors for the presence of a FTA and an English speaking country are all associated with higher
export sales. In contrast, firm export sales are decreasing in the distance between Canada and
the destination as well as the destination being a landlocked country.
191.2 additional immigrant workers is a 10% increase in the average immigrant employment of a firm in the
data used by Hatzigeorgiou and Lodefalk (2016)
20Domestic sales is indicative of firm productivity and firm size in our model
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Table 4.3: OLS estimates of export sales equation
Dependent variable Log exports
(1) (2)
ln immigrant employees from k 0.2716*** 0.2819***
(0.0169) (0.0206)
ln immigrant speaking language from k 0.0472***
(0.0090)
ln domestic sales 0.3488*** 0.2533***
(0.0044) (0.0052)
ln distance -0.4006*** -0.0221
(0.0113) (0.0256)
English dummy 0.2310*** -0.3606***
(0.0166) (0.0497)
Landlocked -0.0523 -0.1328***
(0.0325) (0.0327)
FTA 0.1959*** 0.1348***
(0.0244) (0.0267)
ln GDP 0.2484*** 0.1918***
(0.0045) (0.0063)
ln GDP per capita 0.0067 -0.0134
(0.0072) (0.0089)
Industry and year fixed-effects Yes Yes
Firm-destination observations 190,155 107,843
Adjusted R2 0.272 0.175
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by firm-country. * significant at 10%; **
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Regression (2) restricts the sample to coun-
tries where the first official language is not english.
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We expect the networks employers gain access to from hiring immigrant employees are
more important for exporting when it is more costly to obtain information about a profitable
sales interaction. As argued by Rauch and Trindade (2002), such sales are more likely to in-
volve differentiated goods, goods where, there is no reference price quoted on an exchange and
prices do not convey all relevant information to the buyer. The estimates reported in Table (4.4)
show that the immigrant effect for export sales decomposed into homogeneous and differenti-
ated goods using the Rauch (1999) classification. We confirm that the immigrant employment
effect on firm export sales is driven almost solely through the increase in exports of differenti-
ated goods. A 10% increase in immigrants employed from country k is correlated with a 2.8%
increase in differentiated goods exports sales to country k but only a 0.8% increase in homo-
geneous goods export sales. Additionally, the language effect that we discussed earlier is only
present in the sale of differentiated goods.
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Table 4.4: OLS estimates of homogeneous and differentiated sales equation
Dependent variable Log homogenous exports Log differentiated exports
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln immigrant employees from k 0.0855** 0.0456 0.2860*** 0.2876***
(0.0364) (0.0481) (0.0182) (0.0222)
ln immigrant speaking language from k -0.0078 0.0560***
(0.0090) (0.0097)
ln domestic sales 0.2879*** 0.1957*** 0.3316*** 0.2436***
(0.0118) (0.0155) (0.0047) (0.0056)
ln distance -0.3593*** -0.1541** -0.3776*** 0.0120
(0.0351) (0.0775) (0.0121) (0.0276)
English dummy 0.1192** -0.2038 0.2188*** -0.3721***
(0.0527) (0.1720) (0.0176) (0.0526)
Landlocked -0.5455*** -0.5635*** -0.0055 -0.0804**
(0.1214) (0.1247) (0.0341) (0.0343)
FTA 0.3037*** 0.2674*** 0.1808*** 0.1157***
(0.0810) (0.0875) (0.0260) (0.0285)
ln GDP 0.2277*** 0.1961*** 0.2400*** 0.1864***
(0.0143) (0.0210) (0.0048) (0.0067)
ln GDP per capita -0.1307*** -0.1452*** 0.0163** -0.0061
(0.0229) (0.0288) (0.0077) (0.0094)
Industry and year fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm-destination observations 33,011 16,315 171,741 96,199
Adjusted R2 0.396 0.404 0.237 0.140
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by firm-country. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at
1%. Regressions (2) & (4) restricts the sample to countries where the first official language is not english.
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Table (4.5) reports estimates of the pro-trade effect generated by a linear probability estima-
tion of equation (4.5). The coefficient of immigrant employment on the probability of exporting
is positive and significant at the 1% level. Doubling the number of immigrants employed from
country k increases the probability of exporting there by 1.2%. The other estimates are inline
with our expectations, for example, there is a is 1.9% higher probability of exporting to a coun-
try that shares a FTA with Canada. Is a Portuguese speaking Brazilian immigrant valuable in
promoting new trade links between Canadian firms and Portugal? Our estimate of the immi-
grant language effect in column (2) suggests that is also true. Doubling the number of language
speakers from country k increases the probability of exporting to country k by a .05%.
Next, acknowledging the potential endogeneity concerns of the previous results we esti-
mate versions of our sales equations adopting different instruments for immigrant employment.
From Tables (4.6) and (4.7) we see that the results are mixed. Using three year lagged employ-
ment we find a strong positive effect of immigrant employment on firm export sales across all
specifications. The elasticity of trade to immigrants is in the same range as our OLS estimates,
0.08-.30, corresponding to a 0.8% to 3% increase in exports to destination k following a 10%
increase in immigrant employment from country k. However, when we use employment by
all other firms in i′s industry and province we find the opposite results. However, the results
in column (2), using our constructed exogenous immigrant labor supply measure should be
taken with some caution given that we reject the Hansen J test null of the instrument exclusion
restriction of exogeneity. A possible reason for this result is that two or more firms are linked
via the supply chain (e.g. intermediate input suppliers), and the decision of one firm to hire
immigrants from country k to facilitate exporting to country k is sufficiently correlated other
firm’s immigrant hiring decisions and export flows in the supply chain. If this correlation be-
tween firms is present and widespread in our data, the assumption of exogeneity of our second
instrument will be rejected - which is has.
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Table 4.5: LPM estimates of export participation equation
Dependent variable Export Participation
(1) (2)
ln immigrant employees from k 0.0387*** 0.0346***
(0.0006) (0.0006)
ln immigrant speaking language from k 0.0015***
(0.0000)
ln domestic sales 0.0034*** 0.0028***
(0.0000) (0.0000)
ln distance -0.0149*** 0.0000
(0.0001) (0.0001
English dummy 0.0131*** -0.0009***
(0.0000) (0.0001)
Landlocked 0.0019** -0.0007***
(0.0000) (0.0000)
FTA 0.0192*** 0.0028***
(0.0002) (0.0001)
ln GDP 0.0045*** 0.0022***
(0.0000) (0.0000)
ln GDP per capita -0.0009*** 0.0007***
(0.0000) (0.0000)
Industry and year fixed-effects Yes Yes
Firm-destination observations 30,149,595 22,651,906
Adjusted R2 0.048 0.022
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by firm-country. * significant at 10%; **
significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Regression (2) restricts the sample to coun-
tries where the first official language is not english.
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Table 4.6: IV estimates of export sales equation
Dependent variable Log exports
(1) (2)
ln immigrant employees from k 0.2775*** -0.3190***
(0.0184) (0.0546)
ln domestic sales 0.3452*** 0.4105***
(0.0046) (0.0072)
ln distance -0.4088*** -0.3720***
(0.0116) (0.0117)
English dummy 0.2342*** 0.2985***
(0.0169) (0.0177)
Landlocked -0.0393 -0.0648**
(0.0333) (0.0327)
FTA 0.1944*** 0.1428***
(0.0249) (0.0250)
ln GDP 0.2491*** 0.2962***
(0.0046) (0.0062)
ln GDP per capita 0.0051 -0.0728***
(0.0074) (0.0101)
Instrument Lagged Employment Province NAICS
Industry and year fixed-effects Yes Yes
Firm-destination observations 181,082 190,155
Kleibergen-Paap rk LM (p) 0.0000 0.0000
Hansen J (p) 0.1451 0.0000
Adjusted R2 0.272 0.257
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by firm-country. * significant at 10%; ** significant
at 5%; *** significant at 1%. Instruments in regression are: (1) lagged employment of workers
from k employed at firm i going back three years, (2) supply of workers in the same province
and industry of firm i excluding their own employment
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Table 4.7: IV estimates of homogeneous and differentiated sales equation
Dependent variable Log homogenous exports Log differentiated exports
(1) (2) (3) (4)
ln immigrant employees from k 0.0854** -0.2871** 0.2954*** -0.2449***
(0.0238) (0.0307) (0.0198) (0.0585)
ln domestic sales 0.2919*** 0.3373*** 0.3263*** 0.3873***
(0.0831) (0.0823) (0.0049) (0.0077)
ln distance -0.3618*** -0.3365** -0.3843*** -0.3515
(0.0398) (0.1279) (0.0123) (0.0124)
English dummy 0.1380*** 0.1829*** 0.2210*** 0.2752***
(0.0527) (0.1720) (0.0176) (0.0526)
Landlocked -0.5148*** -0.5597*** 0.0072 -0.0158
(0.0542) (0.0568) (0.0349) (0.0343)
FTA 0.3140*** 0.2597*** 0.1791*** 0.1325***
(0.1257) (0.1217) (0.0265) (0.0266)
ln GDP 0.2278*** 0.2642*** 0.2406*** 0.2835***
(0.0123) (0.0049) (0.0204) (0.0067)
ln GDP per capita -0.1424*** -0.1926*** 0.0158** -0.0551***
(0.0148) (0.0190) (0.0079) (0.0107)
Instrument Lags Prov NAICS Lags Prov NAICS
Industry and year fixed-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm-destination observations 31,314 33,011 163,796 171,741
Adjusted R2 0.398 0.394 0.237 0.225
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by firm-country. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant
at 1%. Instruments in regression are: (1) & (3) lagged employment of workers from k employed at firm i going
back three years, (2) & (4) supply of workers in the same province and industry of firm i excluding their own
employment english.
4.4.1 Estimates of the hiring first order condition
Our non-linear estimation of equation (4.13) is completed under the same specifications of the
variable and fixed cost functions, τk(Nik) and fk(Nik) as in our linear case. When the costs
follow a power function of the form, τk(Nik) = ψτk (1 + Nik)
−ετ and fk(Nik) = ψ
f
k (1 + Nik)
−ε f the
effects of immigrants on τ and f are,
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∂ log τk (Nik)
∂ log Nik
=
−ετ
1 + Nik
∂ fk (Nik)
∂Nik
= −ε fψ fk
(
1
1 + Nik
)ε f +1
and our estimating equation (4.13) now becomes,
wNik =
σ − 1
σ
ri
Nik∑
j Ni j
+ rik
σ − 1
σ
(
ετ
1 + Nik
)
+ ε fψ
f
k
(
1
1 + Nik
)ε f +1
Nik (4.14)
The results in Table (4.8) correspond to the non-linear estimation of equation (4.14). The re-
sults are consistent with the results outlined in the OLS results from Tables (4.3): immigrant
employment from country k assists with firms increasing their export sales to country k. Ad-
ditional confirmation of the consistency of the pro-trade effect is present when we compare
the results from Table (4.4) with columns (2) and (3) of Table (4.8); immigrant employment
increases export sales for differentiated goods. Less conclusive are the results on firm entry,
corresponding to the estimates in the components on fixed costs.
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Table 4.8: NLS estimates of the employment and export sales equation
Dependent variable: wNik
(1) (2) (3)
Export goods type: all homogeneous differentiated
Components in the variable cost
Immigrant employees from k 0.0061*** -0.0039*** 0.0082***
(0.0004) (0.0012) (0.0005)
Components in the fixed cost
Immigrant employees from k -1.0009*** -0.8438*** -1.0966***
(0.0032) (0.0071) (0.0033)
ln distance -0.6982*** -0.5734*** -0.9242***
(0.0124) (0.0284) (0.0148)
English Dummy 0.4628*** 0.5445*** 0.2842***
(0.0070) (0.0170) (0.0081)
Landlocked 0.6987*** 1.4760*** 0.7687***
(0.0248) (0.1298) (0.0240)
FTA -2.3391*** -2.1869*** -2.6923***
(0.0374) (0.0904) (0.0431)
Firm-destination observations 137,383 26,038 124,681
Adjusted R2 0.657 0.640 0.663
RMSE 0.0068 0.0065 0.0064
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by firm-destination. * significant at 10%; ** sig-
nificant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
4.5 Conclusion
In this study, we have added to the limited literature on the relationship between firm export
sales and their foreign-born employment using a novel administrative dataset from Canada.
Our results suggest that there exists a strong pro-trade immigrant employment effect on firm
export sales; both the intensive and extensive margin of firm exports are positively affected
by immigrant employment. Exploiting the level of detail in linked employer-employee data
to gain a better sense of the heterogeneity of the pro-trade immigrant effect is an important
avenue to explore for future research. For example, do higher educated immigrants have a
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larger impact on increasing firm export sales relative to low skilled immigrants? Where in
the firms’ employee organizational chain are immigrants most effective in promoting exports?
We suspect that foreign-born sales managers would be more effective in increasing exports
sales to their country of origin compared to foreign-born production line workers. Or how has
Canada’s immigration policy, one that encourages and emphasizes skilled immigrants, aided
the pro-trade relationship that we see? Exploring these questions will give us a better sense of
how firms utilize their immigrant work-force to engage in profitable trade. This is particularly
relevant for the literature that aims to accurately measure the aggregate impact of migration on
the welfare of native-born workers.
Lastly, given that firms are likely making hiring decisions with future export decisions in
mind (Molina and Muendler, 2013) a future theoretical contribution would be extending our
framework to a dynamic setting.
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Conclusion
Each of the three chapters of my thesis relate to topics in International Economics. The first two
chapters study the effects of migration on the economic outcomes of stayers for both receiving
and sending countries. In both these chapters I develop and calibrate two distinct general
equilibrium (GE) models to study the quantitative effect of migration on the real income of
workers. In my final chapter, which is joint work with Professor Ananth Ramanarayanan, we
study the relationship between firm export behaviour and the foreign-born worker composition
at Canadian manufacturing firms using unique Canadian administrative tax data.
In Chapter 2, I calibrate a multi-country GE model of migration to quantify the economic
impact of international migration to OECD and non-OECD countries. In my model consumers
observe wages, prices, and migration costs for all possible destination countries and choose
to reside in the country that maximizes their utility. Using this model I quantify the effects
of migration for high and low skilled native-born stayers. My main experiment is to quan-
tify the wage impact from sending all migrants back to their country of birth, i.e. undoing
worldwide migration. In a world of no migration, high skilled workers see a larger decrease in
their wages relative to low skilled workers in non-OECD countries. I also find that low skilled
workers in OECD countries are slightly better off from migration. These findings are qualita-
tively consistent with country-level analysis for large OECD countries, the United States and
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Canada (Aydemir and Borjas, 2007; Ottaviano and Peri, 2012). In addition to the no-migration
counterfactual I also use the calibrated model to estimate the migration response of workers to
the expansion or reduction of member countries in the European Union (EU). In one experi-
ment, I model the response of workers to the United Kingdom leaving the European Union -
commonly referred to as Brexit. I find a limited wage impact from Brexit. In the steady state,
workers across Europe alter their migration decisions and mitigate the wage impact observed in
Europe and in the UK stemming from Brexit. The loss in migration from the rest of Europe is
offset by a drop in British emigration to the rest of Europe, reducing a significant portion of the
potential wage losses. Future research in this area would benefit from incorporating additional
features of international migration in a GE framework with endogenous migration. For exam-
ple, introducing a fiscal environment to study how the contribution of migrants to countries’
national budgets e.g. their collection of social benefits, impacts large destination countries.
As well as adding income from remittances into the budget constraint of native-born stayers.
Remittances provide a substantial boost to consumer income for some source countries. For
example remittances sent home constitute over 15% of GDP for Jamaica, El Salvador and the
Philippines.
In a series of papers on international trade and migration networks, Rauch (2001) and
Rauch and Trindade (2002) show migrant networks can play a key role in overcoming in-
formational barriers to international trade by acting as intermediaries between firms across
countries. In Chapter 3, I quantitatively assess the welfare impact of migration accounting
for this trade-creation channel, and gauge its relative importance in contributing to the overall
welfare impact from migration. To measure the trade-creation effect I develop a multi-country
GE model where the decision of consumers on where to migrate and the decision of firms on
which markets to serve interact. Firms sell goods in all markets that are profitable, and operate
in a ”Melitz-style” monopolistic competition market environment. In addition to the trade-
creation effect of migrants, migration also affects consumers through: i) labor market effects
due to changes in nominal wages and ii) firm entry and exit decisions stemming from market
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size effects. I calibrate my model for a set of 43 countries and assess the welfare impact of
migration by comparing welfare under the currently observed levels of migration to a counter-
factual scenario with no migration. My quantitative results show that the welfare contribution
of the trade-creation effects of migration are important, particularly for countries with high
levels of emigration and a diaspora spread among many countries. I find the average consumer
in a net-emigration country gains 1.4% from the trade-creation effect of migration. Overall,
my analysis provides a positive view of the welfare effects of migration, particularly for pop-
ular destination countries like the United States and Canada. Additional investigation on the
robustness of this result are avenues for future study. Some promising areas include, but are
not limited to, adding fiscal channels: immigrant contributions to national budgets, and social
equity channels: immigrant impact on the overall level of income redistribution and inequality.
In Chapter 4 we investigated how firms’ immigrant employment affects their exporting be-
havior to the home countries of their immigrant workforce using a unique employer-employee
manufacturing dataset. Given the limited success in replicating trade patterns using primarily
differences in productivity across firms (Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz, 2011), firms must exhibit
other differences that vary their ability to overcome the frictions of international trade. Immi-
grant employment is theorized to play a key role in overcoming information frictions for firms
by acting as intermediaries between firms and inducing trade (Rauch, 1999, 2001; Rauch and
Trindade, 2002). However, the limited availability of matched employer-employee data has
limited progression in this line of research. We add to the limited firm level evidence on the
pro-trade effect of immigrant employment at firms using matched employer-employee Cana-
dian data and provide causal estimates of the immigrant trade-creation effect that overcomes
both the unit of observation and endogeneity bias concerns of earlier studies. We find that an
increase in immigrant employment from a particular source country is associated with an in-
crease in the probability of exporting to that destination and an increase in export sales to that
destination. Using the detail of our unique data to gain a better sense of the heterogeneity of the
pro-trade effect across different immigrant groups is an important avenue to explore for future
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research. For example, do higher educated immigrants have a larger impact on increasing firm
export sales relative to low skilled immigrants? Fully understanding the relationship between
immigrant employment and firm export behaviour will be crucial for future research evaluating
the impact of migration on the Canadian economy.
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A.1 Data
A.1.1 Missing Data
For several countries for which we have detailed bilateral migration data I am missing their
education attainment numbers. For these countries I assign the average of their region, deter-
mined by Barro and Lee (2013).
Table A.1: Education Attainment
Country Region
Burkina Faso Sub-Suharan Africa
Hong Kong Advanced Economies
Iran, Islamic Rep. Middle East and North Africa
Puerto Rico Latin America and the Caribbean
Notes: Using 2010 education attainment data sourced from
Barro and Lee (2013)
A.1.2 Country Descriptive Statistics
Table (A.2) lists all 83 countries used in my sample as well as some basic country level statistics
such as total population, and immigrant population.
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Table A.2: Country Statistics
Country Population
High Skilled
Fraction
GDP per
Capita (USD) Immigrants Emigrants
Albania 2,913,021 0.015 $4,094 16,138 916,374
Argentina 41,223,889 0.117 $10,276 1,620,210 768,899
Armenia 2,877,311 0.214 $3,218 185,626 618,251
Australia 22,031,750 0.380 $51,874 6,013,093 389,156
Austria 8,363,404 0.174 $46,858 1,012,776 374,203
Belarus 9,490,583 0.220 $6,029 1,075,291 1,007,133
Belgium 10,895,586 0.300 $44,380 1,464,709 403,497
Botswana 2,014,866 0.041 $6,346 91,222 26,590
Brazil 196,796,269 0.113 $11,224 543,961 1,107,849
Bulgaria 7,395,599 0.235 $6,843 14,260 724,880
Burkina Faso 15,605,217 0.028 $575 420,850 70,776
Cambodia 14,308,740 0.020 $786 76,761 465,387
Cameroon 19,970,495 0.025 $1,309 340,540 165,575
Canada 34,005,274 0.477 $47,447 6,859,385 1,154,001
Chile 16,993,354 0.181 $12,860 211,202 505,394
Colombia 45,918,097 0.198 $6,251 75,589 1,340,341
Costa Rica 4,545,280 0.188 $8,199 351,546 110,790
Croatia 4,417,781 0.183 $13,506 529,850 542,432
Cyprus 1,112,607 0.309 $30,818 134,538 159,829
Czech Republic 10,474,410 0.165 $19,808 727,368 366,952
Denmark 5,547,683 0.286 $58,041 450,615 179,754
Dominican Republic 9,897,985 0.103 $5,451 349,900 1,059,564
Ecuador 14,934,690 0.116 $4,657 153,360 921,630
Egypt 84,107,606 0.101 $2,602 157,130 437,163
El Salvador 6,164,626 0.068 $3,474 32,110 1,241,115
Estonia 1,331,475 0.348 $14,639 194,796 132,683
Fiji 859,950 0.131 $3,652 11,340 176,389
Finland 5,363,352 0.316 $46,202 220,610 256,319
France 65,027,512 0.244 $40,703 6,818,647 1,410,597
Germany 81,776,930 0.243 $41,786 10,350,815 3,639,715
Greece 11,121,341 0.268 $26,918 1,229,537 655,366
Hong Kong 7,024,200 0.294 $32,550 530,333 520,155
Hungary 10,000,023 0.194 $13,092 376,691 425,472
Iceland 318,041 0.277 $41,676 29,135 32,390
Indonesia 242,524,123 0.075 $3,113 169,620 1,299,802
Iran 74,567,511 0.151 $6,532 1,197,239 897,489
Ireland 4,560,155 0.443 $48,672 683,133 739,147
Israel 7,623,600 0.433 $30,643 1,741,065 224,278
Italy 59,277,417 0.121 $35,849 4,489,457 2,387,429
Continued on next page
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Table A.2 – continued from previous page
Country Population
High Skilled
Fraction
GDP per
Capita (USD) Immigrants Emigrants
Japan 128,070,000 0.301 $44,508 1,421,127 773,604
Kenya 41,350,152 0.079 $967 271,290 283,922
Latvia 2,097,555 0.180 $11,326 477,320 246,948
Liberia 3,948,125 0.053 $327 61,520 87,812
Lithuania 3,097,282 0.293 $11,985 255,877 398,708
Luxembourg 506,953 0.319 $104,965 190,598 36,423
Malawi 15,167,095 0.004 $459 177,330 243,227
Malaysia 28,112,289 0.164 $9,071 1,424,668 304,502
Mali 15,075,085 0.019 $708 223,970 146,190
Malta 414,508 0 .135 $21,088 14,934 95,668
Mauritius 1,250,400 0.053 $8,000 24,784 139,687
Mexico 117,318,941 0.177 $8,960 607,803 11,343,114
Mozambique 24,221,405 0.005 $419 230,001 503,497
Namibia 2,173,170 0.022 $5,192 83,529 49,250
Netherlands 16,615,394 0.288 $50,338 1,617,710 720,170
New Zealand 4,350,700 0.368 $33,691 1,132,848 552,873
Nicaragua 5,737,723 0.112 $1,526 40,060 555,476
Niger 16,425,578 0.011 $370 68,737 69,504
Norway 4,889,252 0.294 $87,770 518,236 137,805
Panama 3,643,222 0.236 $7,937 140,120 171,241
Paraguay 6,209,877 0.104 $3,226 164,017 620,208
Peru 29,373,646 0.209 $5,022 61,402 1,049,786
Poland 38,042,794 0.211 $12,598 589,820 3,277,180
Portugal 10,573,100 0.127 $22,539 810,416 1,599,694
Puerto Rico 3,721,525 0.116 $26,436 451,968 1,422,878
Romania 20,246,871 0.119 $8,297 105,266 2,644,179
Russian Federation 142,849,449 0.620 $10,675 13,677,467 3,758,557
Rwanda 10,246,842 0.014 $563 31,183 45,221
Slovak Republic 5,391,428 0.173 $16,601 136,122 482,061
Slovenia 2,048,583 0.223 $23,437 219,494 90,204
South Africa 50,979,432 0.061 $7,275 2,846,897 610,608
Spain 46,576,897 0.257 $30,737 5,113,275 878,198
Sudan 34,385,963 0.028 $1,476 91,116 122,811
Sweden 9,378,126 0.282 $52,076 1,229,285 248,352
Switzerland 7,824,909 0.332 $74,606 1,586,396 492,184
Tajikistan 7,641,630 0.087 $738 48,861 428,857
Thailand 67,208,808 0.125 $5,075 2,358,560 587,741
Togo 6,502,952 0.026 $488 267,694 63,654
Trinidad and Tobago 1,328,100 0.096 $16,684 41,738 319,009
Turkey 72,326,914 0.107 $10,672 1,537,287 2,585,281
Continued on next page
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Table A.2 – continued from previous page
Country Population
High Skilled
Fraction
GDP per
Capita (USD) Immigrants Emigrants
United Kingdom 62,766,365 0.283 $38,893 7,373,907 3,855,045
United States 309,348,193 0.573 $48,374 41,307,385 1,488,050
Uruguay 3,374,415 0.094 $11,938 161,355 303,625
Zambia 13,850,033 0.015 $1,463 597,640 152,587
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B.1 Solving for total firm sales between countries
Total sales from all firms in country j to country i is equal to the sum of all sales of all firms
that meet the input requirement ϕ¯Tji,
XTji =
∫
ϕ¯Tji
pTji (ϕ) q
T
ji (ϕ) e
T
j dG (ϕ)
Taking this ratio and substituting in the demand that country i has for country j’s tradeable
goods, qTji,
XTji =
∫
ϕ¯Tji
pTji (ϕ) p
T
ji (ϕ)
−σT
(
PTi
)σT−1
µT YieTj dG (ϕ)
Substituting in the for price, pTji, between j and i in the tradeable sector,
XTji =
∫
ϕ¯Tji
 σTσT − 1 w˜ jτ
T
ji
ϕ
1−σT (PTi )σT−1 µT YieTj dG (ϕ)
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Rearrange and integrating over the firms that find it profitable to export results in,
XTji =
(
σT
σT − 1 w˜nτ
T
n j
)1−σT (
PTi
)σT−1
µT YieTj
∫
ϕ¯Tji
ϕσT−1γϕ−1−γdϕ
XTji =X
T
i
(
σT
σT − 1w˜ jτ
T
ji
)1−σT (
PTi
)σT−1
eTj γ
(−
ϕ
T
ji
)−1+σs−γ
γ + 1 − σs
Substituting in for the productivity cutoff ϕTji,
XTji = X
T
i
(
σT
σT − 1 w˜ jτ
T
ji
)1−σT (
PTi
)σT−1
eTj γ
(
w˜ jτTji
PTi
× σT
σT−1
(
f Tji
) 1
σT −1
(
σ−1T µT Yi
) −1
σT −1
)−1+σT−γ
γ + 1 − σT
Which can be simplified to,
XTji =
XTi
(
w˜ jτTji
)−γ
eTj
(
f Tji
)1− γσT −1
Θ
−γ
j
with Θ−γi =
∑
k
nk
Y
( ∼
wkτTki
)−γ (
f Tki
)σT −1−γ
σT −1 and where I have assumed that eTj , the total mass of
potential entrants in sector T is country j is proportional to total income in j, Y j as in Chaney,
2008.
B.2 Solving for average firm sales between countries
Taking total firm sales (B.1) and dividing by the number of firms that find it optimal to export,
denoted by, NTji , gives an equation for average firm sales between countries j and i.
XTji
NTji
=
µT Yi (w˜ jτTji)−γ( f Tji )1− γσT −1 eTjΘ−γi
(
1
−
ϕ
T
ji
)γ
eTj
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The denominator of equation (B.2) represents the probability of any firm in j exporting to
country i multiplied by the number of potential exporting firms in j, eTj
Substituting in for the productivity threshold gives,
XTji
NTji
=
µT Yi
(
w˜ jτTji
)−γ (
f Tji
)1− γσT −1 eTj Θγi(
w˜ jτTji
PTi
× σT
σT−1
(
f Tji
) 1
σT −1 ×
(
σ−1T µT Yi
) −1
σT −1
)−γ
eTj
Which can be simplified to,
XTji
NTji
=
µT Y j
(
w˜ jτTji
)−γ (
f Tji
)1− γσT −1 Θγj(
w˜ jτTji
)−γ (
PTi
)γ (
f Tji
) −γ
σT −1
(
σT
σT−1
)−γ ( 1
σT
) γ
σT −1 (µT Yi)
γ
σT −1
XTji
NTji
=
(µT Yi)
1− γσT −1
(
f Tji
)
Θ
γ
i(
PTi
)γ ( σT
σT−1
)−γ ( 1
σT
) γ
σT −1
Finally substituting in for the price level, PTi , and simplifying over several steps produces
the desired average sales equation,
XTji
NTji
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XTji
NTji
=
(µT Yi)
1− γσT −1
(
f Tji
)
Θ
γ
i(
ΘiY
1
γ− 1σT −1
j
(
σT
σT−1
) (
σ−1T µT
) 1
γ− 1σT −1 ( γ
γ+1−σT
) −1
γ
)γ (
σT
σT−1
)−γ ( 1
σT
) γ
σT −1
XTji
NTji
=
(µT Yi)
1− γσT −1
(
f Tji
)
Θ
γ
i
Θ
γ
i Y
γ
γ− γσT −1
i
(
σT
σT−1
)γ (
σ−1T µT
) γ
γ− γσT −1 ( γ
γ+1−σT
) −γ
γ
(
σT
σT−1
)−γ ( 1
σT
) γ
σT −1
XTji
NTji
=
(µT Yi)
1− γσT −1
(
f Tji
)
(YiµT )
1− γσT −1
(
1
σT
)1− γσT −1 ( γ
γ+1−σT
) −γ
γ
(
1
σT
) γ
σT −1
XTji
NTji
=
(
f Tji
)
1
σT
(
γ
γ+1−σT
)−1
B.2.1 Equations and steps to solve the model
Sales across countries
Ygj denotes the value of output in sector g in country j and X
g
j denotes the value of sales or
expenditure in sector h in country j. Total spending in a country by consumers. XNj + X
T
j has
to be equal to total production in a country YNj + Y
T
j .
As shown above, total sales from all firms in country j to country i that meet the input
requirement ϕ¯Tji can be written down as,
XTji =
XTi
(
w˜ jτTji
)−γ
eTj
(
w˜ j f Tji
)1− γσT −1
Θ
−γ
i
Total output in the trade sector in country j, YTj , is equal to the sum of exports from country
j to the rest of the world
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YTj =
N∑
i=1
(
w˜ jτTji
)−γ
eTj
(
w˜ j f Tji
)1− γσT −1
[
k= 1]N
∑
eTk
( ∼
wkτTki
)−γ (
w˜k f Tki
)σT −1−γ
σT −1
XTi
Free entry condition
The free entry condition pins down the number of firms that find it profitable to enter the
market.
E
 J∑
j=1
1 ji
[
ϕ
] (
piV,hji (ϕ) − w˜ j f hji
) = w˜ j fe
where 1 ji
[
ϕ
]
indicates whether firm ϕ in j finds it profitable to sell in country i and piV,gji (ϕ)
are variable profits from selling there. With free entry firms will continue to pay fe to get a
productivity draw until expected profits from doing so are zero.
Numerical solution steps
1. Make guesses of wages, price vectors and mass of firms for each country and each sector{
w jH, w jL; PNj , P
T
j ; e
N
j , e
T
j
}J
j=1
2. Construct the composite cost of labour cost using w jH, w jL; w˜ j =
(
θσHw
1−σ
jH + θ
σ
L w
1−σ
jL
) 1
1−σ
3. Solve for the productivity cutoffs
−
ϕ
g
ji =
∼
w jτTji
A jPhj
(
f hji
∼
w j
Y jA j
) 1
σh−1 (σg
µg
) 1
σg−1 σg
σg−1 using our guesses of
Pgj and that Y j = w˜ jL j
4. With
−
ϕ
g
ji and the guesses of P
g
j , e
g
j , and w˜ j I can solve for total profits across all firms in
sector g in country j, FEgpi j =
∑
i
1
σg
((
σg
σg−1
w˜ jτ
g
ji
A j
)1−σg (
Pgi
)σg−1
µgYiγ
) (−
ϕ
g
ji
)−1+σg−γ
γ+1−σg −
∼
w j f
g
ji
(−
ϕ
g
ji
)−γ
5. Using
−
ϕ
g
ji I can compute a new set of the price indices P¯
g
j
6. Iterate until for both sectors g in all countries j
(a) P¯gj − Pgj = 0
116 Chapter B. Chapter 3 Appendix
(b) FEgpi j −
∼
w j fE = 0
(c)
∑N
i=1
 w˜ jτTjiA j
−γe j(w˜ j f Tji )1− γσT −1
[
k=1]N
∑
eTk
( ∼
wkτTki
)−γ(w˜k f Tki )σT −1−γσT −1 X
T
i − w˜ jL jµT = 0
(d)
(
w jHL jH + w jLL jL
)
− w˜ jL j = 0
B.3 United States and Canada Trade Relations
On May 31, 2018, the United States(U.S.), announced tariffs on imports of steel products from
Canada at the rate of 25% and tariffs on the imports of aluminum products at the rate of 10%.
Canadian exports of steel and aluminum subject to the tariffs in 2017 was valued at C$7.2 and
C$9.2 billion for steel and aluminum products, respectively.
In response to these tariffs, on July 1, 2018 the Canada imposed countermeasure tariffs
against C$16.6 billion on U.S. imports of Canadian goods. Steel and aluminum products ac-
count for C$8.2 billion, the remaining C$8.4 billion in tariffs are on a variety of goods that
include maple syrup, whiskies, and inflatable boats21. The tariffs range from 10% to 25% and
the Canadian government has announced they will remain in place until the U.S. eliminates
their trade-restrictive measures against Canadian steel and aluminum products22.
Table (B.1) shows a complete list, aggregated at the product level, of goods subject to tariffs
and the level of tariffs imposed.
21Canadian International Merchandise Trade: Table (2201)
22Department of Finance publication entitled ”Countermeasures in Response to Unjustified Tariffs on Canadian
Steel and Aluminum Products”
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Table B.1: Trade values of products subject to tariffs, customs basis, 2017
Product Tariff % Canadian 2017 trade value (C$ millions)
Steel products 25 5,590
Aluminum products 10 2,658
Sauces and condiments 10 818
Tissue products 10 731
Motorboats 10 610
Coffee 10 525
Chocolate and candy 10 519
Household appliances and parts 10 515
Plastic bags 10 447
Personal care products 10 381
Paper products 10 377
Furniture 10 363
Plastic household articles 10 343
Lawnmowers 10 301
Soft drinks and flavoured water 10 253
Beef 10 212
Soups 10 204
Water heaters 10 175
Orange juice 10 165
Plywood 10 152
Mattresses 10 147
Chicken 10 124
Detergents 10 121
Room deodorizers 10 121
Pizza and quiche 10 119
Others 10 592
Canadian International Merchandise Trade (customs basis) (2201).
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Appendix C
Chapter 4 Appendix
C.1 Variable List and Sources
Tables C.1 and C.2 provide a detailed breakdown of the variables names, sources and de-
scription of the data we use in our empirical study of the relationship between immigrant
employment and firm export behaviour. This data is accessible at the Canadian Centre for Data
Development and Economic Research (CDER) located within Statistics Canada in Ottawa,
Canada.
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Table C.1: Employee Data
Variable Name Source Description
country birth IMDB Immigrant’s country of birth
country citizenship IMDB Immigrant’s country of citizenship
country residence IMDB Immigrant’s country of last permanent residence
d t1 pc T1 Postal code of residence (scrambled)
destination cma IMDB The Census Metropolitan Area (CMA) of destination of
the immigrant at landing in Canada (2011 SGC)
education qualification IMDB Education qualification
eid T2 Identification number of the enterprise employing the in-
dividual (scrambled)
emp inc T4 T4 earnings from a particular business number associated
with the enterprise denoted by eid
immigration category IMDB Immigration category
landing age IMDB Age at admission
landing year IMDB The year in which the permanent resident was admitted
level of education IMDB Level of education
LM intention IMDB Intended skill level of the immigrant at the time of ad-
mission
mother tongue IMDB Immigrants primary or native language
NOC5 CD11 IMDB Intended Occupation at the 5 digit level (2011 ESDC
classification)
official language IMDB Self-declared indicators of an immigrants knowledge of
an official language at admission
pid T1 Personal ID, based on the SIN (scrambled)
skill level cd11 IMDB Skill level of the immigrant at the time of admission
prov emp T4 Province of employment
prov res T4 Province of residence
t1h commission gross T1 Gross commission income
t1h DV age T1 Age (on December 31 of the reference year)
t1h earn t4 T1 Total employment earnings from T4
T1h marst T1 Marital status
T1h net inc calc T1 Calculated net income
t1h prov of res T1 Province of residence
t1h tot inc calc T1 Calculated total income
t1h ui ben T1 Contains the amount of income from unemployment in-
surance during the tax year in question
T1h yob T1 Year of birth
tax yr T1 Reference year (calendar)
years of schooling IMDB Number of years of schooling for permanent residents
Business Register (BR); Income Tax and Benefit Return (T1); Statement of Remuneration (T4); Immi-
gration Database (IMDB); Corporate Income Tax Accounts (T2)
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Table C.2: Enterprise Data
Variable Name Source Description
d opaddress pc BR This field is used to register the Postal Code associated
with the civic address of the operating entity (scram-
bled)
eid T2 Identification number of the enterprise employing the
individual (scrambled)
entmultiestablishmentflag BR This field is used to register that there are more than 1
establishment in the enterprise
entmultilocationflag BR This field is used to register that there are more than 1
location in the enterprise
gross profits T2 This item represents the net amount of Item 8089, To-
tal sales of goods and services, less Item 8518, Cost of
sales
naics4 BR Four-digits NAICS for incorporated businesses
total assets T2 This item represents the total of all current, capital,
long-term assets, and assets held in trust and must be
reported line 2599
total expenses T2 Any amount reported under this item should be equal
to the amount reported under Item 8518, Cost of sales,
plus the amount reported under Item 9367, Total oper-
ating expenses. line 9368
total liabilities T2 This item represents the total of all current and long-
term liabilities and must be reported
total revenue T2 This item represents the sum of all revenue amounts
country edesc TEC Country English description
country iso code TEC Country ISO code. This code is defined by the Inter-
national Standards Organization
hs8 TEC Eight digit commodity code. For each establishment,
there can be multiple HS8
us relationship code TEC US Import Attribute) Related and non-related code
used as a means of identifying economic activity
value TEC Contains all the value for duty amounts of the ship-
ment
Business Register (BR); Immigration Database (IMDB); Corporate Income Tax Accounts (T2); Trade-
by-Enterprise Characteristics (TEC)
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C.2 Derivation of firm sales equations
C.2.1 Firms’ export sales decisions
Preferences of the representative consumer in country k for goods from firm i are
U (q1k, q2k, q3k, . . . , qik) =
(∫
i∈Ωk
α
1
σ
ikq
σ−1
σ
ik di
) σ
σ−1
where Ωk are the set of goods available in country k. αik is a firm-country specific demand
shock that is lognormally distributed i.i.d across firms and countries, qik is demand for firm i
goods in country k and σ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution across goods.
Country k′s demand for any good i is given by solving the maximization problem:
max
{qik}
=
(∫
i∈Ωk
α
1
σ
ikq
σ−1
σ
ik di
) σ
σ−1
s.t.
∫
i∈Ωk
pikqikdi = Yk
where Yk is total income in country k.
To solve for demand qik, take a ratio of the first order conditions with respect to goods i and
j and substitute this ratio into the representative consumer’s budget constraint in country k.
L
qik ,q jk
=
(∫
i∈Ωk
α
1
σ
ikq
σ−1
σ
ik di
) σ
σ−1
+ λk
(
Yk −
∫
i∈Ωk
pikqikdi
)
First order condition w.r.t qik
σ
σ − 1
(∫
i∈Ωk
α
1
σ
ikq
σ−1
σ
ik di
) 1
σ−1
α
1
σ
ik
σ − 1
σ
q
−1
σ
ik =λk pik (C.1)
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First order condition w.r.t q jk
σ
σ − 1
(∫
i∈Ωk
α
1
σ
jkq
σ−1
σ
jk d j
) 1
σ−1
α
1
σ
jk
σ − 1
σ
q
−1
σ
jk =λk p jk (C.2)
Ratio of (C.1) and (C.2)
(
αik
α jk
) 1
σ
(
qik
q jk
) −1
σ
=
pik
p jk(
qik
q jk
) −1
σ
=
(
pik
p jk
) (
αik
α jk
) −1
σ
qik =
(
pik
p jk
)−σ (
αik
α jk
)
q jk (C.3)
Use (C.3) to sub it into our budget constraint
∫
i∈Ωk
pik
((
pik
p jk
)−σ (
αik
α jk
)
q jk
)
di =Yk
pσjkq jk
1
α jk
∫
i∈Ωk
p1−σik αikdi = Yk
q jk = Ykα jk p−σjk
1∫
i∈Ωk p
1−σ
ik αikdi
Sub q jk into (C.3) and solve for the demand function qik
qik =
(
pik
p jk
)−σ (
αik
α jk
) Ykα jk p−σjk 1∫
i∈Ωk p
1−σ
ik αikdi

qik = (pik)−σ αik
Yk∫
i∈Ωk p
1−σ
ik αikdi
Where the price index Pk =
(∫
i∈Ωk p
1−σ
ik αikdi
) 1
1−σ . We can now write demand for any good i in
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country k as,
qik = Ykαik p−σik
1
P1−σk
(C.4)
Or in terms of expenditures,
xik = Ykαik
(
pik
Pk
)1−σ
(C.5)
C.2.2 Firms’ export sales decisions with multiple sectors
The representative consumer in country k now has preferences for differentiated goods (D) and
homogenous goods (H) goods from firm i in each respective sector:
U
(
qD1k, . . . , q
D
ik, q
H
1k, . . . , q
H
ik
)
=
∫
i∈ΩDk
(
αDik
) 1
σD
(
qDik
)σD−1
σD di
 σDσD−1µD ∫
i∈ΩHk
(
αHik
) 1
σH
(
qHik
)σH−1
σH di
 σHσH−1µH
where ΩDk , Ω
H
k are the set of goods available in country k in the differentiated and homogenous
goods sectors. αDik, α
H
ik are firm-sector-country specific demand shock that is lognormally dis-
tributed i.i.d across firms, sectors, and countries, qDik, q
H
ik are the demand for firm i
′s goods in
each sector in country k and σD > 1, σH > 1 are the elasticity of substitution across goods in
each sector.
Country k′s demand for any good i from either sector is given by solving the maximization
problem:
max
qDik ,q
H
ik
=
∫
i∈ΩDk
(
αDik
) 1
σD
(
qDik
)σD−1
σD di
 σDσD−1µD ∫
i∈ΩHk
(
αHik
) 1
σH
(
qHik
)σH−1
σH di
 σHσH−1µH
s.t.
∫
i∈ΩDk
pDikq
D
ikdi +
∫
i∈ΩHk
pHikq
H
ikdi = Yk
where Yk is total income in country k.
Following the same sequence of steps as outlined in the 1 sector problem we solve for
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demand for any good i from each sector in country k as,
qDik = Y
D
k α
D
ik
(
pDik
)−σD 1(
PDk
)1−σD (C.6)
qHik = Y
D
k α
H
ik
(
pHik
)−σH 1(
PHk
)1−σH (C.7)
Or in terms of expenditures,
xDik = Y
D
k α
D
ik
(
pDik
PDk
)1−σD
(C.8)
xHik = Y
H
k α
H
ik
(
pHik
PHk
)1−σH
(C.9)
taking the prices indicies as PDk =
 ∫
i∈ΩDk
(
pDik
)1−σ
αDikdi

1
1−σD
and PHk =
 ∫
i∈ΩHk
(
pHik
)1−σ
αHikdi

1
1−σH
C.2.3 Firms’ hiring decisions
To write the firm’s problem in terms of labor input choices, we start from output: for each
destination k to which firm i sells, to satisfy demand it must produce qik = τk (Nik) p−σik αikEk,
which can be inverted to: (
qik
τk (Nik)
)−1/σ
(αikEk)1/σ = pik
So revenues for firm i from selling to k are:
rik = pik
qik
τk (Nik)
=
(
qik
τk (Nik)
)σ−1
σ
(αikEk)
1
σ
To write the profit maximization problem in terms of labor inputs {Nik}k=1,...,K , first take as
given firm i’s total output yi, and solve for the quantities exported to each country k, qik. Firm i
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allocates its sales to maximize revenues, taking as given the αik’s:
max
{qik}
∑
k
Ξikq
σ−1
σ
ik (τk (Nik))
1−σ
σ (αikEk)
1
σ
s.t.
∑
k
Ξikqik ≤ yi
The first order conditions for output produced for sale to k, qik, and output produced for do-
mestic sale, qi1, conditional on Ξik = 1, yield:
σ − 1
σ
q
−1
σ
ik (τk (Nik))
1−σ
σ (αikEk)
1
σ = λi
and for domestic output:
σ − 1
σ
q
−1
σ
id (αidEd)
1
σ = λi
So taking the ratio of these two,
qi1
αikEk
αi1E1
τk (Nik)1−σ = qik (C.10)
Summing equation (C.10) across k and rearranging gives:
qid
αidEd
=
yi∑
k ΞikαikEkτk (Nik)
1−σ (C.11)
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Using (C.10) and (C.11), we can write total revenues as:
∑
k
Ξikq
σ−1
σ
ik (τk (Nik))
1−σ
σ (αikEk)
1
σ =
∑
k
Ξikq
σ−1
σ
id
(
αikEk
αidEd
τk (Nik)1−σ
)σ−1
σ
(τk (Nik))
1−σ
σ (αikEk)
1
σ
=
(
qid
αidEd
)σ−1
σ ∑
k
ΞikαikEkτk (Nik)1−σ
=y
σ−1
σ
i
∑
k
ΞikαikEkτk (Nik)1−σ

1−σ
σ ∑
k
ΞikαikEkτk (Nik)1−σ
=y
σ−1
σ
i
∑
k
ΞikαikEkτk (Nik)1−σ

1
σ
Firm i’s production technology is yi = φi
∑
k Nik, so with total revenues given by (4.12), the
profit maximization problem is:
max
{Nik}k
φi ∑
k
Nik

σ−1
σ
∑
k
ΞikαikEkτk (Nik)1−σ

1
σ
− w
∑
k
Ni j −
∑
k
Ξik fk (Nik)
Conditional on Ξik = 1, the first order condition for Nik is:
0 =
σ − 1
σ
φi ∑
j
Ni j

σ−1
σ −1
φi
∑
j
Ξi jαi jE jτ j
(
Ni j
)1−σ
1
σ
+
φi ∑
j
Ni j

σ−1
σ 1
σ
∑
j
Ξi jαi jE jτ j
(
Ni j
)1−σ
1
σ−1
αikEk (1 − σ) τk (Nik)−σ ∂τk (Nik)
∂Nik
− ∂ fk (Nik)
∂Nik
− w
Using the fact that revenue shares are given by
rik
ri
=
rik∑
j Ξi jri j
=
τk (Nik)1−σ αikEk∑
j Ξi jτ j
(
Ni j
)1−σ
αi jE j
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We can substitute in yi and multiply by Nik throughout and simplify the first order condition to:
σ − 1
σ
(yi)
σ−1
σ
Nik∑
j Ni j
∑
j
Ξi jαi jE jτ j
(
Ni j
)1−σ
1
σ
+ (yi)
σ−1
σ
∑
j
Ξi jαi jE jτ j
(
Ni j
)1−σ
1
σ
αikEkτk (Nik)1−σ∑
j Ξi jai jE jτ j
(
Ni j
)1−σ 1 − σσ ∂τk (Nik)∂Nik Nikτkl (Nik)
−∂ fk (Nik)
∂Nik
Nik
= wNik
Now, the factor αikEkτk(Nik)
1−σ∑
j Ξi jαi jE jτ j(Ni j)1−σ
is the share of sales to k, since the first order condition from
above for any j, k give:
qi jτk (Nik)1−σ αikEk = qikτ j
(
Ni j
)1−σ
αi jE j
So we can write revenue share as:
rik∑
j Ξi jr j
=
(
qik
τk(Nik)
)σ−1
σ (αikEk)
1
σ
∑
j Ξi j
(
qi j
τ j(Ni j)
)σ−1
σ (
αi jE j
) 1
σ
=
τk (Nik)1−σ αikEk∑
j Ξi jτ j
(
Ni j
)1−σ
αi jE j
So substitute in for revenues ri and rik to write:
wNik
ri
=
σ − 1
σ
Nik∑
j Ni j
+
rik
ri
1 − σ
σ
∂ log τk (Nik)
∂ log Nik
− ∂ fk (Nik)
∂Nik
Nik
ri
And assuming a value for σ, we can move the first term to the left hand side,
wNik
ri
− σ − 1
σ
Nik∑
j Ni j
=
rik
ri
1 − σ
σ
∂ log τk (Nik)
∂ log Nik
− ∂ fk (Nik)
∂Nik
Nik
ri
(C.12)
Equation (C.12) forms the basis for estimating the causal effect of immigrant employment
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on a firm’s export sales to destination k.
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